Like all countries in the region, the recent foreign fighter phenomenon that emerged after 2012 brought the issues of radicalisation and violent extremism into the focus of Montenegrin officials. In 2015, they responded by developing a Countering Violent Extremism Strategy, followed by an associated National Action Plan. Yet, respondents in this research noted that a key problem with the Strategy was that it only loosely defined responsibilities for implementation. One interviewee from the police told researchers that police agencies cannot be expected to bear the burden of prevention alone and emphasised the need for an interdisciplinary approach, saying that “this is a problem for all of society, and a partnership between the state and civil society is crucial.” Officials who were interviewed also stressed the need to differentiate between non-violent and violent extremism; acknowledging that there is “radicalism in Montenegro” but asserting there is little risk of violence. Still, though Montenegro has fewer obvious problems with extremism and radicalisation than some neighbouring countries, Montenegro did see some citizens depart as aspiring fighters to ISIS territory in Syria and Iraq, as well as to Eastern Ukraine – but those who have returned are not viewed as a significant threat by officials, though their activities are
monitored. Our researchers found that unofficial parajamaats – which operate outside the authority of the Islamic Community of Montenegro (ICM) and tend to preach radical ideologies – have been established in four towns in Montenegro, but intelligence officials claim they are not associated with extremist groups or sleeper cells. When asked about forms of extremism in Montenegro, interviewees mostly identified three main forms: violent takfirism, non-violent Salafism, and pan-Slavism and Orthodox extremism. There are positive indications that non-violent Salafists in Montenegro are less conservative and fundamentalist than those in BiH. The popularity of Sufi preacher Hafiz Sulejman Bugari, who moved from BiH and was quickly accepted by Salafists across Montenegro, signals that Montenegrin Salafists may be ideologically flexible. Bugari’s popularity is also evidence that certain charismatic leaders could play an important role in deradicalisation efforts. Bugari has openly distanced himself from “any individual action or any project which is not for the common good.” Though he has never openly challenged Salafi ideology, his messaging that Islam is a tolerant and inclusive religion, and his innovative approach to religious leadership – which includes a strong internet presence and comfort with media appearances – makes him very appealing to young people who are interested in Islam. Indeed, he is well-liked even beyond the youth demographic, and was hailed by interviewees across the spectrum, even Salafists, as a figure they respect. Salafists who were interviewed indicated that they view the secular Montenegrin state, inclusive identity, and Western imperialism as threats; and the antidote for the most extreme of these believers is an Islamic State. Further research that draws on framing theory, which “focuses on how movements and social collectives construct, produce and disseminate meanings,” would be valuable in Montenegro, particularly to analyse how the political context or links between the most influential extremist figures can account for this framing. The small population size of Montenegro also offers ideal conditions for research on extremism in the context of social network theory. Several key actors clearly play a significant role in Salafi proselytising in Montenegro, for example, and it is obvious that their influence goes beyond religion to serve broader political aims; examining this further would be valuable moving forward. Some of the factors at play in radicalisation across the globe are also factors in Montenegro. And, with a youth unemployment rate over 40% (twice the overall rate of 18%), policymakers must address unemployment and other structural factors with an appreciation for links between these factors and the vulnerability of certain communities to extremist influences. This is especially important because economic marginalisation appears to be a driver of radicalisation in Montenegro and other research has concluded that extremist groups sometimes “recruit from the ranks of the unemployed and underemployed.” What’s more, government actors must form alliances with women’s organisations that place governmentNGO/CSO partnerships at the centre of efforts to prevent radicalisation among young women in Montenegro, who were identified by respondents as an at-risk group. Finally, charismatic but moderate figures like Hafiz Sulejman Bugari should be viewed by policymakers as potential crucial allies in P/CVE. Voices of moderation should be amplified and engaged as part of educational components in both P/CVE and de-radicalisation initiatives.