This policy paper summarizes the current state of affairs regarding the linkages of
terrorist groups in West Africa with terrorist networks in other African regions. It also
provides recommendations for policymakers and security agencies.

The paper looks at linkages of JNIM, IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), and IS in the Greater
Sahara (ISGS) with terrorist groups in North, West-Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa.

In West Africa, ISWAP’s activities have been regionally confined to Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and
Cameroon. There is no indication that ISWAP intends to expand its territorial base beyond
these countries or that it has any transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other parts
of Africa.

JNIM and ISGS have demonstrated that they possess the intention and capability of
regional expansion across West Africa. Increasing attacks further southwards in West
Africa and their presence in the neighboring regions of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin
suggests that both groups intend to expand their geographical zone of influence to the Gulf
of Guinea. There is, however, no indication of either JNIM or ISGS forming a
transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other African sub-regions.

In North, West-Central, East, and Southern Africa, there are also currently no indications that
terrorist groups have developed linkages with other terrorist networks beyond their own
region.

Terrorist groups in West Africa are pragmatic in their approach to collaborations.
Their choice of network linkages is guided by local dynamics and their own particular
agenda rather than ideology. Hence, existing linkages are driven by the involvement in
transnational organized crime (TNCO), potential financial gains as well as the potential of
financing terrorism via local and international sources, training of fighters, foreign terrorist
fighters from other African countries, and weapons smuggling and use of small arms and
light weapons (SALWs).