This publication explores the drivers of violent extremism (VE), with special reference to the Muslim world in the past three decades. This publication’s primary objectives are to summarize what we know, and what we do not know, about the drivers of violent Islamist extremism (VIE); to pinpoint recurrent drivers across a wide variety of countries, so as to clue the analyst confronted with a particular situation to some of the potentially relevant dynamics and factors; and to identify some ofthe most common misconceptions or pitfalls in the study of VIE, so as to avoid potentially counterproductive approaches when designing development assistance programs with a counter-extremism component. This Guide does not discuss programmatic implications — which, for reasons of space, will be developed in a separate, stand-alone document.

The Guide developed out of a comprehensive literature review. While it did not involve significant new
data collection, it endeavored to take into account existing data in books, articles, surveys and policy reports. Much of what is known about VIE is based on the experience of countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). South Asia also represents a significant source of relevant information. By contrast, much less is known about VIE in sub-Saharan Africa — which, in comparison to the MENA and
South Asia regions, has been relatively sheltered from it. Inevitably, therefore, this document reflects the imbalance that exists in sources and expertise. In addition, some countries are able to produce dependable information about the identity of violent extremists active in their midst, while others are not. Consequently, it is difficult to infer from existing data reliable generalizations (across countries and regions) about the profile of the populations drawn to VIE. For instance, Israeli, Palestinian and Western sources contain a wealth of information about the socioeconomic, professional and educational background of suicide bombers active in the Israeli-Palestinian theater. That information has tended to suggest that the suicide bombers in question have not been poor individuals with little education. However, researchers are hard pressed to find a similarly rich data pool about the background of suicide bombers in Afghanistan and Pakistan.