Violent extremism stemming from the foreign fighter phenomenon, and the Islamist religious extremism in general has dominated the public discourse on threats in Kosovo since the end of 2013 to this day. Nevertheless, while the foreign fighter threat has been evident, this report suggests that violent extremism in Kosovo has manifested itself in other forms as well, such as political based and ethnic based violent extremism. While the “supply” of foreign fighters from Kosovo has diminished, some of the emerging threats from the phenomenon include the imprisoned foreign fighters and radical extremists, and the potential returnees that still remain in conflict zones. For the latter category, the report suggests that the risks are not as high as generally believed.
There is no single profile that can describe foreign fighters in Kosovo or those embracing similar violent extremist ideas shared by the Islamic State and other similar groups in Syria and Iraq. Most of those that travelled to Syria or Iraq belong to 20-30 age-group. If children (0 to 15 age group) are included in the count, as many as 80 per cent of Kosovo originating foreign fighters were 30 or younger at the time of their departure. Kosovo originating foreign fighters and those embracing similar ideas, generally have slightly more advanced levels of education than the average Kosovo citizen. Yet their average socio-economic condition is below the Kosovo average; they tend to be poorer, and seem to have had less access to opportunities to reach good standards of living compared to the average Kosovo citizen. Likewise, the unemployment rate among Kosovo originating foreign fighters is double than the Kosovo average, and most of those that have had prior employment, have worked in non-permanent and unstable jobs.

There are several factors that drive people to become foreign fighters or embrace similar ideologies even if they do not travel to conflict zones. The often-mentioned factor, such as education, does not appear to be a compelling explanation, though this report recognises the fact that education entails a much broader category than simply the level of education one attains. Nonetheless, when conducting tests with other education indicators (such as illiteracy rate, or school (non)attendance), education still does not appear to be a strong factor in driving the phenomenon. Instead, the findings of this research suggest that significant drivers of the phenomenon seem to be based around the notion of an identity vacuum (expressed as a detachment from the established social fabric), as well as very close intra-family ties of younger generations (such as siblings, relatives, or even long-time friendships outside families). A closer investigation of profiles of 90+ randomly selected individuals who have travelled to Syria/Iraq, or those that belong to violent extremist groups, shows that around 70 per cent of them had close or extended family relations. Close to 40 per cent of these 90
individuals were siblings.

These factors working in conjunction seem to also play a role in those few cases where individuals may have very stable socio-economic conditions. Poorer socio-economic conditions on individual/family level (not general country- or municipal-level structural levels), appear to also exacerbate the phenomenon. The inquiry into potential links between violent extremism and organised crime did not reveal evidence of any such links. There are a number of examples whereby individuals have attempted to profit out of the phenomenon, but this certainly appears to be neither organised nor structural, and quite isolated.

As for the links between those who embrace violent extremist ideas, their cooperation transcends state borders. It should be noted that there is little (if any) evidence that the often-mentioned cases of Middle East funded religious based NGOs directly recruited people into violent extremist ideological groups, or exacerbated the phenomenon. Nonetheless, the report also shows that state actors, especially those dealing with matters of security, almost always view the Middle Eastern presence with heightened suspicion. The cooperation between violent extremists does not happen through such NGOs that are registered and operate publicly. The international cooperation between violent extremists occurs more through close personal contacts, either physically or virtually.