




Hedayah
countering violent extremism

UNDERMINING VIOLENT EXTREMIST NARRATIVES IN EAST AFRICA A HOW-TO GUIDE

SARA ZEIGER
AUGUST 2018



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IN EAST AFRICA**
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ABOUT THIS GUIDE

This Guide is the follow-on product of the “Expert Workshop on East and Horn of Africa Collection of Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)”, held 5-7 February 2018 in Kigali, Rwanda. The workshop and How-To Guide are funded through the support of the U.S. Department of State.

This Guide and the annex of counter-narratives are available and accessible through Hedayah’s existing Counter-Narrative Library (www.cn-library.com). For more information on the project, please see Annex A. For access to the Counter-Narrative Library, please contact cnlibrary.admin@hedayah.ae.

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EXPERTS (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

This How-To Guide could not have been drafted without the insights and contributions from the group of experts that attended the workshop in Kigali, Rwanda. The experts contributed to the workshop through presentations and discussions that shaped this Guide and populated it with examples of counter/alternative narratives. These experts are:

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INTRODUCTION

Terrorism and violent extremism have been a problem in East Africa¹ over the course of the past several decades. This problem has manifested from ethnic, religious, social, economic, cultural and tribal conflicts. The diversity of the region has at times contributed to the worsening of factors leading to radicalization and violence, but at other times has helped to build community resilience and to foster transitions from conflicts to peace.

The most recent and pressing threat in the region continues to be Al-Shabaab, based out of Somalia but with evidence of operating also in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. After a truck bomb exploded in Mogadishu in October 2017, killing over 350 people, it is clear that Al-Shabaab will not disappear as a threat to the region in the near future (“This was not ‘just another bomb,’” 2017). From a lens of preventing and countering violent extremism, undermining the radicalization and recruitment narratives of Al-Shabaab is highly important to the region.

At the same time, there are a number of localized conflicts that have the potential of manifesting in violent extremist activity in the region. Moreover, inconsistent national politics and freedom of movement have allowed different factions of rebel and violent extremist groups to form even across borders. For example, a Uganda-born rebel movement, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is operating out of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and recruiting individuals across the Western border of Uganda. Considered a terrorist group by the Ugandan government, the ADF was initially founded in religious ideology (Islamic) but has since morphed to include political ideology as part of their recruitment efforts. Still a threat to the DRC and the Ugandan government, the ADF is suspected of conducting an attack in Semuliki, DRC, in 2017 (“RDC: Mandats d’Arrêt,” 2018).

In other countries, swift political changes have created scenarios for new violence to potentially emerge. For example, in Burundi in 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would run for a third term in office, sparking protests across the country. One month later, a coup led by Major General Godefroid Niyombare attempted to oust the President unsuccessfully. While the political negotiations to change the term limits of the Presidency have resulted in some constitutional changes, violence has manifested in political protests throughout the country—with several attacks in Bujumbura occurring throughout summer 2017 (“Three killed in Burundi grenade attack,” 2017).

Historically speaking, East Africa has also been susceptible to several violent conflicts and violent extremist groups. For example, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was a key threat to Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the mid-1990’s. Under the leadership of Joseph Kony, the LRA wanted to ultimately establish a democracy based on the Ten Commandments. However, the LRA is also historically ethnic Acholi from northern Uganda, meaning there are ethnic tensions affiliated with its political goals. Most well-known worldwide, the violent genocide perpetrated by the Hutu government against the Tutsi in Rwanda in the mid-1990’s serves as an extreme example of massive loss of life and the potential dangers of violent extremism. Finally, in the 1970’s a violent military junta, the Derg, plagued Ethiopia with a genocide in what was known as the Qey Shibir or “Red Terror,” where political opponents of the Marxist-Leninist group in power were killed *en masse* (“Mengistu is handed life sentence,” 2007).

¹ For the purposes of this report, the region includes Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, South Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda.

Given both the current and historical context of East Africa and its complexities, it is important to stop the spread of messages of hate, violence, violent extremism and terrorism throughout the region, and instead provide alternative approaches to overcome conflict and tensions between different groups. Moreover, in an age where internet and social media play a significant role in the lives of young people susceptible to violent extremism, it should be noted that in the context of East Africa, the majority of the recruitment in the region is still taking place “offline” (UNDP, 2017). This means that counter-narratives and alternative narratives for the efforts of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) need to include components that materialize on traditional forms of media, or take place in a face-to-face setting.

The aim of this How-To Guide is to provide practitioners, civil society organizations and policymakers engaging in the space of counter-messaging and counter/alternative narratives with a tool to better enhance and amplify the messages against violent extremism in East Africa. The Guide includes a detailed list of open-source counter-narratives and alternative narratives that are culturally and socially resonant and relevant to the variety of contexts and countries in East Africa (See Annex B). The languages of the narratives in the collection include Arabic, English, French, Kirundi, Somali, and Swahili.

This Guide was developed using a mixed methodological approach through two core components. First, the relevant counter-narratives, good practices and case studies were collated through recommendations from a group of experts that convened in Kigali, Rwanda from the 5-7 February 2018 at an “Expert Workshop on East and Horn of Africa Collection of Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).” The workshop was hosted by Hedayah and the IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE). Second, the author of the report conducted desk research to supplement context, content and theoretical frameworks in this Guide. It should be noted that the present How-To Guide takes a similar format and structure from two previous reports by Hedayah, *Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in South East Asia: A How-To Guide* (Zeiger, 2016), and *Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in Middle East and North Africa: A How-To Guide* (El Sayed, Faris & Zeiger, 2017). The previously devised framework relied on a development process that included inputs from counter-narrative experts, academics and government officials, and underwent a peer review process, and therefore provides a good foundation for this and additional How-To Guides in the series.




WHAT IS “COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM” (CVE)?

In the spectrum of counter-terrorism approaches, the “soft” or “preventive” strategies, policies and programs that identify and challenge the “push” and “pull” factors of radicalization and recruitment are described as “countering violent extremism” or CVE programs and policies.

For the purposes of this How-to Guide, CVE describes both the longer-term prevention strategies that address potential macro socioeconomic and political factors, and the specifically designed targeted interventions that take place at both the community and individual level (to include psycho-social counseling for at-risk individuals as well as detainees) (Original text box from Zeiger, 2016).

DEVELOPING A COUNTER-NARRATIVE

In accordance with Hedayah's previous series of "How-To Guides," there are 9 steps to developing a counter-narrative for CVE (Zeiger, 2016):



1 UNDERSTAND AND ASSESS RELEVANT PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

For any P/CVE intervention, including those in the counter-narrative space, the first step to the process is to understand the local context and local drivers of radicalization. In East Africa, there are some very particular factors that lead an individual towards violent extremism, and due to the diverse nature of society it is all the more relevant to assess the local drivers of radicalization at a community level before designing any counter-narrative campaign.

In order to illustrate this concept for the region of East Africa, previous How-To Guides have utilized the USAID (2011) model of identifying “push” factors and “pull” factors. However, it should be noted that there has been recent literature by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that has defined these drivers of radicalization as “structural drivers,” “individual incentives,” and “enabling factors” (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2016, p. 10). As such, in the below framework, all three categories are used to more articulately differentiate the individual and psychological “pull” towards terrorism that are internal attractions compared to the external factors that may facilitate a faster recruitment process. This is particularly important for the context of East Africa where historically speaking, charismatic leaders such as Joseph Kony are especially important in recruiting new followers and maintaining the support of the group.

The chart below summarizes the main drivers of radicalization in East Africa. It should be noted that there have been a number of significant studies investigating the drivers of radicalization in different East African country contexts. Therefore, the chart comprises of information from two sources: 1) the discussions on drivers of radicalization during the Expert Workshop in Kigali; and 2) key drivers indicated in relevant literature coming out of East Africa. This list is not intended to be comprehensive, but instead shows the diversity in types of factors that may lead to radicalization and recruitment to various terrorist groups and militant groups in the region.

It is important to determine the main causes or drivers of radicalization in the region or locality before designing any CVE intervention, but in particular for counter-narratives for two main reasons: 1) to avoid the fallacy of incorrectly labeling a population as “vulnerable” without proper assessment; and 2) to correctly choose a target audience that might be most influenced by the counter-narrative.

PUSH FACTORS/ STRUCTURAL MOTIVATORS	PULL FACTORS/ INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES
<p><u>Political</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops and their presence in Somalia; • Weak governance, especially in rural areas across East Africa (Dualeh, 2015); • Aggressive actions taken by security or police that exacerbate local grievances (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2012); 	<p><u>Social /Psychological</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incentive to find a spouse due to prestige in a militant organization; • Revenge, for example for police brutality or execution of family member (Scofield Associates, 2017); • Ability to have a career (Botha, 2016);




Figure 1: Potential Push and Pull Factors in East Africa.

Note: This chart is for illustrative purposes and should not be considered a comprehensive list. Factors can differ across countries and between regions within the same country, and grievances can be real or perceived.

² For example, in Uganda where the LRA members only had access to primary school education (80%) (Botha, 2015).

³ For example, there have been calls to action by domestic supporters of Al-Shabaab such as the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque and the Muslim Youth Center near Eastleigh (starting in 2008) in Kenya. Reportedly these recruitment centers are no longer operating overtly, and radicalization has “gone underground” since 2012 (Odhiambo, E., Onkware, K., & Leshan, M, 2015).

2 IDENTIFY THE TARGET AUDIENCE

The next step in the process of developing a counter-narrative to violent extremism is to identify the main target audience your campaign wants to address. As mentioned in Hedayah's first How-To Guides for South East Asia and Middle East and North Africa, this Guide takes a marketing approach that defines the target audience as the core and central component of the campaign (El Sayed, Faris & Zeiger, 2017). A description of the specific target audience should include age, gender, education level, localization, priority interests and online activities (Tuck & Silverman, 2016).

Defining the target audience is especially important in the context of East Africa, where manifestations of violent extremism and their narratives incorporate elements of different ethnicities, tribes, religions and social backgrounds. Moreover, the narratives utilized by violent extremists adapt to the local languages and dialects of each region, country and district within the country. For example, Al-Shabaab may start a video with Arabic to establish religious legitimacy, but then switch to Swahili or Somali for the targeted recruitment message. As such, a counter-narrative campaign designer should also consider the resonant language of the target audience they are trying to reach.

There is also a tendency to emphasize "youth" as a target audience for counter-narrative campaigns. However, as the experts at the workshop in Kigali pointed out, the category of "youth" is not a tailored target audience. Therefore, campaigns should have in mind the particular subset of youth they want to address and anticipate their needs and interests in the design process. This tactic is often used, for example, by Al-Kataib Foundation for Media Productions, the media arm of Al-Shabaab by matching the message to the needs and interests of the target audience and the grievances in the local community.⁴ Some examples of different subsets of a "youth" population may include:

- Youth in the formal education system
- Youth who have dropped out of school
- Youth in urban areas versus youth in rural areas
- Youth who have been released from prison or were engaged in criminal networks
- Youth with families and no basic source of income
- Youth with education and no employment

It was noted at the Kigali workshop that youth that have participated in gangs or criminal activity were particularly susceptible to recruitment by groups such as Al-Shabaab. In this respect, Al-Shabaab sometimes uses the criminality of an individual to coerce or pressure that person to join their cause—threatening to expose them if they do not participate in terrorism.

In addition, the campaign designer should take into consideration what is considered "cool" in the community. One expert at the workshop indicated that effective violent extremist propaganda is "rebel cool" because it shows defiance and rebellion against governments. He gave the example of complaints from the local community when police do not confront protesters because it is "cool" to be seen as rebellious.⁵

⁴ Presentation by Matthew Freear at Expert Workshop on "Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism in East and Horn of Africa," February 2018, Kigali, Rwanda.

⁵ Presentation by Sami Gathii at Expert Workshop on "Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism in East and Horn of Africa," February 2018, Kigali, Rwanda.

Types of Target Audiences

GENERAL AUDIENCE

Counter-narratives aimed at a general audience may emphasize shared cultural or historical values, may underline common themes of humanity, or may emphasize peace, tolerance and solidarity (Briggs & Feve, 2013). In the context of East Africa, campaigns aimed at a general audience may include participatory theatre, public concerts and public debates and dialogues. It is important to note here that the counter-narrative for a general audience should still be as localized as possible, and tailored to fit the needs of the community. The grievances and challenges a community faces will vary from country to country and region to region within the same country.

KEY INFLUENCERS

This type of target audience refers to influential community actors such as tribal leaders, teachers, peer groups, family members or social workers. Key influencers are the individuals that have the best ability to impact “vulnerable” individuals. However, key influencers may lack knowledge of how to engage and counter-message. For example, mothers of victims of terrorist attacks may have powerful stories, but may not be trained on how to deliver their message. Therefore, campaigns aimed at key influencers can incorporate elements of building the knowledge and skills for message delivery.

SYMPATHIZERS

This category refers to individuals who do not actively or publicly/vocally support violent extremism but may be sympathetic to some of the arguments made in terrorist propaganda due to cultural, social and historical context of the region. Sympathizers are passive in their support for violent extremism—they may not act when faced with messages of violent extremism, but silently agree with those messages. This category also includes individual that are “at risk” of radicalization or actively viewing terrorist propaganda online (Briggs & Feve, 2013).

JUSTIFIERS

The category of “justifiers” includes individual who actively justify the arguments and actions of terrorist groups in a public or semi-public way. This encompasses, for example, a preacher that actively supports military actions against the Somali government, including those violent actions taken by Al-Shabaab.

PERPETRATORS AND TERRORISTS

The most challenging target audience to reach for counter-narratives as they are comprised of dedicated individuals that are actively participating in terrorism or inciting violent activities to achieve their political, ideological or religious objectives. In the context of East Africa, this would include terrorists captured and imprisoned by governments, or those convicted of a terrorist crime.

3 IDENTIFY THE EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED

The next step in the process is to identify the main message of violent extremist propaganda that the counter-message will address. The narrative that is countered can be either explicitly or directly addressed, or implicitly addressed (i.e. providing an alternative narrative or solution to a grievance).

Building on some of the modules presented through previous How-To Guides, the most relevant narratives of violent extremists from East Africa are:

POLITICAL & MILITARY NARRATIVES

SOCIAL & PERSONAL NARRATIVES

ETHNIC & CLAN-BASED NARRATIVE

RELIGIOUS & IDEOLOGICAL NARRATIVES

ECONOMIC NARRATIVES

It should be noted that in the examples below, some of the groups identified are not considered terrorist groups by international standards. However, the narratives of militant or insurgent groups are also extremely relevant for the context of East Africa, and therefore some of the relevant propaganda strategies of these organizations are described to better contextualize the narrative types given. It should also be noted that the narratives of violent extremists in East Africa are also adaptive and have changed over time—therefore it is important to consider the latest and changing narratives of violent extremism.⁶

Political and Military Narratives

The most common narratives utilized by violent extremists in East Africa to recruit and radicalize individuals use political and military justifications for exhorting violence. Several examples of political and military narratives are summarized below. However, this list should not be considered comprehensive, as the variety of violent extremist narratives in the East Africa region is large.

1. Operational Capacity and Ability to Govern.

This narrative utilizes political arguments to suggest that the terrorist group is more credible as a governing body than the governments in East Africa. For example, prior to the elections in Kenya in June 2017, Al-Kataib Foundation for Media Productions, Al-Shabaab's media arm, released a video titled "An Analysis of Events: A Message to the Muslims in Kenya" that emphasized Al-Shabaab's abilities to obtain resources, territory and protect their own, implicitly suggesting the Kenyan government cannot govern appropriately (MEMRI, 2017). Similarly, in a video produced by Al-Shabaab after a January 2016 attack that killed over 100 troops, the focus of the video is on the vulnerability and defeat of the troops in the attacks, and the success of Al-Shabaab in that attack (PBS, 2016). A third example of this narrative strategy can be seen in the propaganda that was put out on Radio Andalus in mid-January 2013 after the failed rescue attempt of Denis Alex, a French hostage. The messages put out immediately after that attempts claimed: "victory in repelling the attack" and demonstrating its authority and capacity to operate (Sikorski, 2014).

Another example of political narratives is the Allied Democratic Forces manifesto that explained that the purpose of the movement was to overthrow the

⁶ For a good review of the shifting tactics of Al-Shabaab in their media strategies for the past decade, see a report by Hate Speech International (Anzalone, 2016a).

Ugandan government, and warned that anyone supporting President Museveni would be killed or responsible for the targeted deaths of their family members (Titeca & Vlassenroot, 2012). Similarly, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has claimed that the social and economic inequalities faced by the population in Northern Uganda, and the inability of the government to provide basic services, were justifications for the rebellion (Jackson, 2002). Out of Rwanda, the rebel group "Forces démocratiques de liberation du Rwanda" (FDLR) attempts to convince the Rwandan refugees living in the DRC that the Rwandan government is oppressing Hutus, and should therefore take up arms against the government ("Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda," 2015).

2. War against Islam.

The main narrative utilized by Al-Shabaab is to mobilize support for violent "jihad" against Western governments, Somali governments and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As Timothy Sikorski (2014, p. 10) puts it, this type of narrative involves "portraying the actions of Western nations, the Somali government, and AMISOM as being part of a larger war on Islam, with the governments in the Horn of Africa beholden to Western interests." It should be noted that Al-Shabaab's guerrilla war with Ethiopia has helped to support this claim, suggesting that the Ethiopians were "acting as puppets of the Western 'far enemy' intent on attacking Islam" (Ibid). This is evidenced further by propaganda videos throughout their existence that have featured encouragement of attacks and martyrdom against Western targets, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), AMISOM, or the Ethiopian military (Anzalone, 2016a). For this particular narrative, it remains to be seen what the effects might be of the AMISOM troop withdrawal on the propaganda tactics that are utilized by Al-Shabaab.

3. Establishment of a religious "State".

Particularly utilized by Al-Shabaab, this argument emphasizes the establishment of a state based on Islamic principles and "sharia" law. In a historical sense, Al-Shabaab takes its ideology partially from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which was formed as a "pseudo-government providing some semblance of law and order through strict enforcement of sharia law in vast ungoverned areas of Somalia" (Sikorski, 2014, p. 10). According to a 2016 report, the "narratives in Al-Shabaab's films also promote the notion of an idyllic 'Islamic' polity capable of representing and defending the interests of Muslims domestically, regionally and globally" (Anzalone, 2016a, p. 10).

The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Uganda was also founded in the context of the Ugandan Mujahidin Freedom Fighters movement that retaliated against a 1992 Ugandan Supreme Court ruling and sought to establish an Islamic State free from discrimination against the Muslim population of Uganda (Weeraranate, 2017).

It should be noted here that Daesh⁷ propaganda, which is grounded in the formation of an Islamic "Caliphate" in Syria and Iraq, has also attempted to recruit East Africans. For example, a video in 2015 featured four Somalis and one Ethiopian that called Somalis to join Daesh, referring to their oppression by "Ethiopian Christians."⁸ However, there has been the limited success of Daesh

⁷ This report refers to the terrorist group as Daesh, an Arabic acronym for "ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi 'l-Iraq wa-sh-Sham" (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).

⁸ See "A Message to the Muslims in Somalia," Media Office of Wilayat al-Furat, released on May 21, 2015, in Anzalone, 2016a.

to recruit East Africans to join their cause, despite the high-profile defection of a predominant Al-Shabaab preacher in 2015 (Anzalone, 2016b).

In a similar manner, the ideological roots of the LRA can be traced to the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena, a spiritual and military movement that sought to purify the population and establish an alternative way of life. As Beevor (2017) noted, the subsequent vision of the LRA is more millenarian than the vision of Al Qaeda or Daesh, which is apocalyptic. In other words, the LRA believes they are they are “God’s chosen Elect, destined to ensure that righteousness overcomes evil” (Rinehart, 2006, p. 23). Therefore the State narrative of the LRA is not for the common person—it is for a particular religious elite that is spiritually “pure.” The members of this society were named the “Acholi Manyen” or “New Acholi” (Titeca & Vlassenroot, 2012, p. 65). According to Joseph Kony’s supporters, the authority of his rule was justified based on the Ten Commandments and under the control of the “Holy Spirit” which according to his followers, possessed him (Beevor, 2017).

Social and Personal Narratives

1. Coercion and forced recruitment.

In the context of East Africa, the idea of forced entry into a terrorist group or coercion should not be underestimated. Al-Shabaab often uses the threat of violence to intimidate populations but to also forcibly recruit new members. For example, in 2017, Al-Shabaab was reportedly meeting with clan members from Bay and Bakool in southwestern Somalia to identify children and meet with specific young people ages 9-18 to be educated and trained under Al-Shabaab leadership (Maruf, 2017). The United Nations recently expressed concern over a significant campaign by Al-Shabaab to recruit child soldiers in a 2017 letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (UN Security Council, 2017). However, this is not a recent phenomenon, as Al-Shabaab was reportedly abducting teenage girls to marry their fighters since 2010 (Spillus, 2012).

Historically speaking, the LRA often abducted Acholi children and inundated them to the group with psychological and physical threats. A regular practice was to have new abductees kill a member of their group. As Beevor (2017, p. 504) notes, “killing a companion makes the thought of returning home terrifying. There is also a spiritual impact. In Acholi cosmology, killing pollutes the killer with the cen, the spirit of the deceased, bringing the perpetrator terrible misfortune.” According to interviews with former child soldiers, beatings were common amongst LRA abductees in order to establish fear and power structures (Veale & Stavrou, 2007). Moreover, the LRA commanders often threatened violence or death against family members of recruits that did not comply with the orders or requests from the group (Peel, 2015).

2. Attraction to violence or power.

Where social and economic opportunities are limited, another powerful narrative of terrorist and militant groups in the region is the attractiveness of violence or access to power. For example, experts at the Kigali workshop mentioned that young Kenyans had been said to have been recruited to Al Shabaab when they were provided with a motorcycle upon joining. The motorcycle was seen as a symbol of power, and gave the young Kenyan a certain status in society.

A similar claim was made by a research report by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), that the ease of accessing weapons was part of what attracted youth to violent extremism: “Small arms can further be a status symbol and means of expressing power that attract the youth to resistance movements and crime” (Ikelegbe & Okumu, 2010).

In the LRA, abductees eventually reported that they had a sense of satisfaction and respect as they gained their own credibility in the organization, and they were attracted to the political and spiritual power of their leader (Beevor, 2017). At the same time, according to interviews with former LRA members, good fighters were promoted through the ranks, so even if an individual was forcibly recruited by the LRA, they may eventually find meaning in violent acts as a way to gain power and authority within the group (Peel, 2015).

Ethnic and Clan-Based Narratives

Violent extremist and militant groups in East Africa have capitalized on long-standing ethnic and tribal divisions within society as a way to gain support. The most obvious example would be from the Rwandan genocide separating the Hutu majority from the Tutsi minority—where perpetrators of the genocide justified killing the Tutsi based on ethnic and even physical indicators. Precursors to the genocide, Belgian colonists classified the Rwandan population as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa through measuring height, length of nose and eye shape (Fornace, 2009). Discrimination between different ethnic groups ensued over the course of the next 60 years, and despite the genocide not being entirely an ethnic issue, the ethnic narratives persevered over the course of history and were utilized to justify mass killings of Tutsi (and those who helped them) by the Hutu throughout the Rwandan genocide in the 1990s.

Al-Shabaab also takes advantage of ethnic differences in appealing to different audiences in its propaganda videos. For example, Al-Shabaab points to the historical separation by Western powers of Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the North West Frontier Province in Kenya, and couples this with modern-day discrimination of Muslims in both of those countries, as a way to identify grievances targeted at local communities (Anzalone, 2016a).

On a smaller scale, the ADF in western Uganda mobilized the remnants of the Rwenzuru movement and the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), which capitalized on tensions within the local kingdom and the rejection of the power of the central Ugandan government by the Rwenzuru kingdom (Titeca & Vlassenroot, 2012). Later on, the ADF also adapted to the grievances of the host country (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and gained at least passive support from the Congolese in order to survive.

Religious and Ideological Narratives

While several groups in East Africa utilize religious and ideological narratives to justify their political aims and their violent actions, the religious arguments based on theology are not necessarily the most persuasive to recruits in East Africa. A study conducted by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) found that from those interviewed (which included samples from former Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram members), those that participated in violent extremism had significantly lower levels of religious education and less knowledge of the Qur’an than the control group (UNDP, 2017, pp. 49-50). In this regard, the study notes that

“dogma and indoctrination, rather than more in-depth religious study, influence susceptibility to recruitment” (Ibid, p. 50). Here it could be argued that the religious and ideological narratives used by Al-Shabaab, for example, do not necessarily utilize structured theological arguments to convince their population, but rather create an environment that permits violence based on spiritual and emotional persuasion. Several examples of religious and ideological arguments are indicated below:

1. Righteousness and Elite Religious Authority.

This theme of being the religious elite cuts across several violent extremist groups in the region. In this regard, Al-Shabaab labels those who disagree with them as “infidels” or “apostates” which causes vulnerable individuals to doubt their own religious teaching (UNSOM, 2017). By claiming to have the moral religious authority, and by capitalizing on the lack of religious knowledge of the population (as mentioned above), Al-Shabaab is able to claim that their actions have the ultimate moral “high-ground.” This can also be seen through the promotion of strict religious rituals, enforced through religious punishment or “hudud” (Anzalone, 2016a).

In a similar manner, Kony’s followers in the LRA coupled violent death and destruction with righteousness. In his framework, torture was permissible because the aim was to “purify” the culture and population from “impure” religion and cultures.⁹ Their religious and cultic rituals were also strictly enforced, with violators being subjected to extreme punishments, often death.

2. Violent Offensive “Jihad”.

According to a 2016 report by Hate Speech International, the roots of Al-Shabaab’s ideology of “jihad” can be found in their 2008 “No Peace Except [by] Islam” campaign that promotes a narrow interpretation of the al-Anfal verse, permitting violence against the ‘enemies of God’ whenever and wherever possible (Anzalone, 2016).

Another religious argument refers to the concept of “jihad” as a way to call for action in support of fellow Muslims. For example, according to a former Kenyan Al-Shabaab member, Al-Shabaab recruiters made the individual feel that they were not a proper Muslim because they were not acting against the enemy that was attacking Muslims worldwide (Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2012). Similarly, a film documenting the Westgate Mall attack points out the discrimination of Muslims by the Kenyan government as one of the main reasons for the Westgate attack (Anzalone, 2016a).

3. Migration to establish an Islamic State.

Particularly for Al-Shabaab, the group promotes the idea of performing “Hijrah” (migration) to join their group in Somalia. While this argument is slightly more relevant for those recruits to Al-Shabaab from the West, such as from the US or Europe, the concept still applies to the context of recruiting individuals from Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia or Uganda. For example, a number of East African foreign fighters—including Kenyans and Tanzanians—have been featured in propaganda videos that are subtitled in Swahili, Arabic, and English, and there has been an increase in Swahili propaganda put out by Al-Shabaab since 2013

⁹ According to an interview with Kenneth Bana, former LRA senior commander, in Beevor (2017).

(Anzalone, 2016b). According to Sikorski (2014), Al-Shabaab's concept of "Hijrah" is rooted in Al Qaeda ideology and is one of the reasons why Al-Qaeda has endorsed Al-Shabaab as taking part in their global jihad.

Economic Narratives

Economic narratives can be seen in a number of different ways—to include the promise of cash rewards, access to materials or consumer goods, or opportunities for jobs or employment. All these tactics have been utilized by Al-Shabaab as ways to recruit young people to their organization. For example, a report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) suggested that Al-Shabaab promised 40,000 Kenyan Shillings (500 USD) per month as a salary for group members, which is four times the national average at the time (Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2012). Al-Shabaab has also been reported to give out free phones as a way to entice potential recruits, which they then use to carry out the recruitment process (UNSOM, 2017). Moreover, participants at the Kigali workshop cited examples from Kenya where Al-Shabaab promised to handout motorcycles to those who would join their organization. Further, a study by the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) suggested that unemployment was a significant incentive for recruitment of Al-Shabaab because it creates both "an economic need and an excess of leisure time" (UNSOM, 2017, p. 15).

4 SET CLEAR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

After assessing the local context and main concern that the counter-narrative will address, the next step is to identify the goals and objectives of the counter-narrative and its campaign. The goals and objectives should outline clearly the change in attitude or behavior that is desired in the target audience. This target audience was identified in step 2. The below framework describes possible goals and objectives for the region of East Africa (Zeiger, 2016, p. 12; El Sayed, Faris & Zeiger, 2017, p. 14).

DISENGAGEMENT

This goal focuses on changing behavior where an individual's involvement in violent extremist activities reduces or ceases. Measurable disengagement can take place in settings where the counter-narratives are delivered face-to-face, rather than online. As counter-narrative work in East Africa is best-conducted face-to-face, this goal may be more realistic for this region than other regions.

DIVERSION

This goal focuses on preventing individuals from being interested in violent extremism in the first place, and instead diverts them on other alternative means of expressing opinions or grievances.

RAISING AWARENESS

This goal looks at providing information related to certain aspects of violent extremism. This includes information on drivers and processes of radicalization. This goal may be most applicable when the target audiences are "key influencers."

LIMITING IMPACT

This goal focuses on isolating the narrative or propaganda of violent extremists to limit the effects to an individual or small group. This may be particularly relevant when the messages of violent extremists have the potential to appeal to larger audiences.

UNDERMINING APPEAL

This goal focuses on diluting the appeal to vulnerable individuals, including discrediting the narrative or message of violent extremists to make it less attractive.

MEASURING IMPACT OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

Defining appropriate goals for the counter-narrative is important for measuring its effectiveness. It may be useful to articulate the goals into smaller or more specific sub-goals that are measurable and realistic. It is also important to consider specific indicators that can be assessed and measured over time. For more about measuring the impact of the counter-narratives and campaigns, see Step 9.



Case Study for Goals and Objectives


Watatu Film, Kenya

Description:

Watatu is a film that is set in Mombasa, Kenya that tells the story of three men involved in violent extremism: Yusuf, Salim, and Jack. Yusuf becomes radicalized by a violent extremist group, and his uncle Salim struggles to get him to reject the ideology of the group. Jack, a local policeman, attempts to gain Yusuf's trust to prevent him from conducting an attack. The film then turns to a theatre show, where live actors play out the remaining of the narrative, with input from the live audiences. The actors are given the opportunity to make decisions for the main characters to change the outcome of the story.

For more about Watatu, see SAFE Kenya's Website:

<http://safekenya.org/watatu/>



5 DETERMINE AN EFFECTIVE MESSENGER

After the goals and objectives of the counter-narrative are set, it is important to determine the messenger or messengers that will deliver the message. The experts at the workshop in Kigali emphasized that when considering a messenger, the personal attributes and characteristics such as the cultural, ethnic and religious background of the individual messenger needed to be taken into consideration.

QUESTIONS TO DETERMINE THE RIGHT MESSENGER

- What is the relationship between the messenger and the target audience?
- What is the credibility of that messenger with the target audience?
- What is the potential for that messenger to change attitudes?
- What is the potential for that messenger to change behaviors?
- What are the potential negative effects or risks associated with choosing that particular messenger?

Original text from El Sayed, Faris & Zeiger, 2017.

Youth (Peer-to-Peer)

In the current context of East Africa, youth play a significant role in society and comprise a large portion of the population. According to a report from the African Union, over 60% of East Africa's population is under the age of 30 (Ababa, 2017). In fact, "Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen" (the formal name for Al-Shabaab) means "movement of the youth who strive or struggle," pointing out that Al-Shabaab is targeting young people to carry out their ideals. In addition, peers and social networks play critical roles in shaping identity and creating a sense of belonging—important mechanisms to strengthen in the context of preventing recruitment to violent extremist groups. As such, young leaders can be important instigators of positive change and help prevent their peers from joining terrorist organization.

An example of peer-to-peer messaging from the Burundian context is through www.ivomo.net. In this website, young people are able to start conversations with each other about topics that are important to them in their community. A similar example is through YADEN East Africa's Youth Platform of Opportunity. In this face-to-face platform, young people in Kenya are able to create a community, build a sense of belonging and identity together, build a system to access relevant opportunities for active change in their community, and create a space to create and share messages of change with each other.

A third example of youth as a messenger is through the Anti-Tribalism Movement's "Let them Hear Your Voice" campaign.¹⁰ The campaign called for youth in Somalia to express their opinions about tribal divides in their communities that would be shown to presidential candidates during the elections. The result was that young people in Somalia produced 30-second videos expressing their proposed solutions to community grievances.

¹⁰ The video for the "Let them hear your voice" campaign can be viewed on You Tube here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rh1jAucXv00>



TESTING THE MESSENGER WITH A TARGET GROUP

If there is an opportunity to do so, it is recommended that you test the messenger with a selection of your target audience before conducting the campaign. This might be done through a focus group discussion. Testing how the messenger is perceived by the target audience can help avoid unanticipated consequences in the campaign or bring to light aspects of the messenger's characteristics that you can leverage in the campaign.

Victims and Survivors

Victims and survivors of terrorist attacks, or the family members of victims of terrorism can be powerful messengers that appeal to the emotions of potential perpetrators by showing the negative consequences of terrorism. The model of leveraging the stories of victims and survivors is utilized in Rwanda and Burundi around genocide prevention and education. For example, in an art installation by Pieter Hugo, photographs of survivors of the Rwandan genocide paired with perpetrators of the violence are featured together with their personal narratives highlighting reconciliation and community forgiveness (Ruby & Taylor, 2014). Similarly, the Kigali Genocide Memorial features a room containing the clothing of some of the victims of the genocide, and a short video of the stories of several of the survivors and their experiences. Another example is an initiative by Never Again Rwanda, where “spaces for peace” bring together survivors and ex-perpetrators to discuss their experiences and understand each other’s situations. Those spaces are closed groups, but the experiences and stories are anonymously shared with outsiders as an example of reconciliation and for future prevention of genocide (Kezio-Musoke, 2017).

Religious Leaders

Religious leaders have the potential to impact target audiences especially when the content is focused more on religious or ideological arguments. An example out of East Africa is a program conducted by the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCCPA) to train women, youth and religious leaders on counter-narrative content. In this training, participants learn about which religious messages are most effective in countering the religious arguments of Al-Shabaab, specifically focusing on the interpretations of “jihad,” “takfir,” “Jahiliyyah”¹¹ and other Islamic concepts as well as the claims that Al-Shabaab makes with respect to the Prophet and his companions.

In addition, religious leaders can be role models for interactions between sects or between religions in a tolerant and peaceful way. For example, a group of 300 Sufi clerics met in East Africa in 2015 to discuss violent extremism and release a statement against terrorism (Abdi, 2015). In a region where Sufi values are resonant also with local cultural and tribal traditions, the leadership of the Sufi clerics on this issue bears some significant impact on the community.

Experts at the Kigali workshop did reflect on the challenges to working with religious leaders on counter-messaging. In this regard, it was mentioned that sometimes religious leaders are not the most connected to the youth populations in East Africa, as many of the clerics are of an older generation. To overcome this challenge, the organization Allied Muslim Youth Uganda focuses on training and mentorship of young leaders, including facilitating an interfaith and inter-generational retreat to bring together student communities with religious leaders (Allied Muslim Youth Uganda, 2017). Another possible way to overcome this challenge is to build the knowledge and capacities of young religious leaders that may be more connected to the youth populations.

¹¹ “Jihad” refers to the Islamic concept of “struggle.” “Takfir” refers to the Islamic concept of declaring somebody a non-believer. “Jahiliyyah refers to the Islamic concept of the period of time before Islam, when the world was “ignorant.”

Formers and Defectors

Individuals who once participated in violent extremism and terrorism and that have exited the group have the potential to be powerful messengers to prevent others from joining (Ashour, 2010). A report by Neumann (2015) suggests that defectors from Daesh can deliver four key messages that are also applicable in the context of Al-Shabaab: 1) highlighting in-fighting and divisions within the group; 2) revealing the brutality against Muslims; 3) exposing the corruption and un-Islamic practices of the group; and 4) revealing the poor quality of life (Neumann, 2015). In the East African context, several young Kenyan girls were rescued by the Somalia National Army in 2017 and told the story of how the group's leadership sexually abused them and held them in captivity. The girls, who initially joined out of their own free will, very quickly learned that the group was not what they had expected. According to 16-year-old Halima, "Al-Shabaab is just a marauding gang of killers. There is no Jihad in Somalia, I regret ever supporting them and leaving my family for them" ("Shabaab men turn Kenyan schoolgirls into sex slaves," 2017).

In the Rwandan context, former FDLR fighters are incorporated into the narratives utilized by the Mutobo Demobilization and Reintegration camp to contact current fighters for the FDLR in the attempts to bring them back to Rwandan society. According to a senior former FDLR fighter, Brigadier General Semugeshe Comes, former members were crucial to his return home that "gave [him] assurances that all was well in Rwanda and that nothing would happen to [him]" (Mugabi, 2017).

Grassroots and Community Actors

Grassroots organizations and community actors can be influential messengers because they are connected to the communities' needs and grievances, and often address some of those grievances in their core work. In Tanzania, the Global Peace Foundation initiates counter-narrative campaigns that encourage the community to be non-violent, tolerant and peaceful. For example, the #VijanaNaAmani (Youth and Peace) campaign targeted identity-based conflict in the community by promoting stories of young people active in their communities.

However, it should be noted that in a study conducted by Search for Common Ground on key influencers and networks in Tanzania and Kenya, it was found that civil society members were the least influential of all the potential messengers, which included political leaders, police, religious leaders, classmates and teachers, workplace colleagues, families and peers (Russell, 2017). In this respect, civil society groups may be best placed to provide information and training to messengers that are more influential over the target audience but may not be best suited as a messenger themselves.

Political Leaders

Political leaders can play a significant role in convincing the community that the governments in East Africa are successfully running the countries and fighting corruption, contrary to arguments made by violent extremist groups. For example, a documentary by Breakthrough Media titled "Mayor of Mogadishu" follows the everyday life of the mayor, highlighting the choices he makes and the way he runs the city (Breakthrough, 2016). This documentary helped to reinforce the

message that the Somali government was turning around the country and dedicated to making real change in their community and country.

However, it should be noted that experts at the workshop in Kigali also discussed the ambiguity of utilizing political leaders for countering the narrative of violent extremism in East Africa. First, the political narratives by violent extremist groups accusing political leaders of corruption and/or inability to govern may contain elements of truth, meaning a political leader delivering that message may not be credible to the target audience. Second, public opinions and perceptions of political leaders can change from day to day—meaning that a message that is delivered by a political leader may be undermined if the public perception shifts to the negative. When the message is as important as countering the narrative of violent extremism, it may be more useful to choose a messenger that does not have the potential to undermine the campaign at a later stage.

6 DEVELOP THE CONTENT AND LOGIC OF THE MESSAGE

The next step is to identify the content of the counter-message that is being delivered. Experts at the Kigali workshop also discussed taking a layered approach to content development, to mean exposing the target audience to different content across multiple platforms. For more on this approach, see Step 7. Some different types of counter-narrative content are described in more detail below:

POSITIVE AND ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES

These counter-narratives are proactive and alternative messages that are more attractive than terrorism. Positive and alternative narratives are most effective when they provide an alternative action to address grievances. Below are some examples:

AMANI KWANZA

Amani Kwanza (#AmaniKwanza), meaning “peace is priority” was a campaign run by the Global Peace Foundation that aims to place peace as the number one priority amongst youth. The campaign encouraged the community to speak about how they would protect peace during the election period in Tanzania.

Country: Tanzania



<https://bit.ly/2sa5ec>

KUNDUBURUNDI

This campaign titled “Kunduburundi” or “Esteemed Burundi” by Alkeza.net calls on Burundian youth to love and value their homeland. The campaign featured messages on T-shirts to encourage youth to love their country, build it, edify it, and not destroy it.

Country: Burundi



<https://bit.ly/2MBWQzV>

SOCIAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES

This type of counter-narrative appeals to the “pull” factors that may impact an individual at an emotional or psychological level. This has previously been described as “emotional and ethnical” in past How-To Guides. Below are some examples:

DESTROYED LIVES

The “Destroyed Lives” campaign highlights the stories of mothers of victims of Al-Shabaab attacks. The video, by the Anti-Tribalism Movement, seeks to appeal to the emotions of individuals who might be seeking to join terrorist groups by highlighting the effects on the mothers -who are highly cherished in society.

Country: Somalia



<https://bit.ly/1B1vSK9>

#INSOLIDARITY

In this video through YADEN’s #insolidarity campaign, two young women from Kwale County share their stories and encounters with terrorism. They talk about how youth have been recruited for the terrorist groups and the dangers their community faces with respect to violent extremism.

Country: Kenya



<https://bit.ly/2t4Yge3>

ETHNIC AND TRIBAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES

These counter-narratives seek to overcome ethnic and tribal differences by finding common solutions or common interests. Below is an example:

SOUTH SUDAN: TWO TRIBES REBUILD WHAT VIOLENCE DEMOLISHED

In the video titled “South Sudan: Two tribes rebuild what violence demolished,” Search for Common Ground started a reconciliation program for the Madi and Acholi tribes, which included radio programs and in-person community dialogues. The video outlines ways in which the program brought together different community actors to find common solutions to community tensions.

Country: South Sudan

<https://bit.ly/2lWiikm>



POLITICAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES

Below are some examples of counter-narratives that address political grievances and ideologies:

MAYOR OF MOGADISHU

The film “Mayor of Mogadishu” looks at the mayor in his everyday life to show what it is like to have the responsibility of the city. It promotes the idea that the government of Mogadishu is capable of decision-making and good governance.

Country: Somalia

<https://bit.ly/2GUsdSf>



HUGUETTE LABELLE

The Chair of the Board of Transparency International, Huguette Labelle, speaks about Rwanda being ranked the least corrupt country in Africa in 2013. Highlighting this political fact reduces the ability of violent extremist groups to identify corruption as a reason to join their cause in Rwanda.

Country: Rwanda

<https://bit.ly/2t4LA78>



RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES

This type of counter-narrative refutes the religious claims and provides interpretations of the religious text that do not justify violence. Below are some examples:

RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN MOMBASA AND NAIROBI

The Hanns Seidel Foundation and Well Told Story investigated reasons for religious intolerance in Mombasa and Nairobi. They found that conflicts between Muslims and Christians are often imposed by outsiders. This undermines messages that violent extremists use to divide communities based on faith. The results of the research and interviews were turned into a comic.

Country: Kenya



<https://bit.ly/2HXmThH>

LIFE IN ISLAM

Authored by Ugandan Sheikh Nuwagaba Muhsin Kaduyu, this video message is part of the 'Life In Islam' series aimed at informing Ugandan Muslims how to positively impact their communities. This video is specifically focusing on the proper upbringing of the children from a Muslim perspective.

Country: Uganda



<https://bit.ly/2KWQGsz>

ANNUAL NATIONAL INTERFAITH HARMONY WALK

The Annual National Interfaith Harmony Walk is the largest youth-led interfaith event organized by Allied Muslim Youth Uganda every February during the UN celebration of interfaith Harmony Week. It brings together young people, especially students, to engage each other in activities that build trust and foster mutual understanding by working towards the common goal of interfaith cooperation.

Activities included: a public lecture, inter-generational dialogues, the Harmony Walk, blood donation, community service, interfaith games, inspirational talks, and poetry.

Country: Uganda



<https://bit.ly/2LwJUe4>

ECONOMIC AND VOCATIONAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES

This type of counter-narrative provides economic justifications for not joining terrorist groups or economic alternatives such as employment or job training. Below is an example:

CENTER FOR CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE & PEACEBUILDING

The Stability Fund opened the Center for Conflict, Governance & Peacebuilding at the City University in Mogadishu. The Center offers fully-paid summer internships and offers course materials to prepare the next generation of leaders in Somalia.

Country: Somalia

<https://bit.ly/2thS3ep>
<https://bit.ly/2lQRfqr>



7 IDENTIFY THE MEDIUM(S) THROUGH WHICH THE MESSAGE WILL BE DISSEMINATED

The mechanism by which the counter-narrative or campaign is disseminated can be crucial to ensuring the campaign's effectiveness. The medium should be one that reaches the target audience in a natural and simple way and one that the target audience uses regularly. In the East Africa, online forms of communication are not as common when compared to the rest of the world, and therefore offline channels of communication may be the most effective when it comes to countering the narrative of violent extremists. According to a survey by We are Social and Hootsuite, the internet penetration in Eastern Africa is 27% and the social media penetration is 7% (We are Social and Hootsuite, 2018). This is low compared to the global internet penetration (53%) and the global social media use (42%), as well as the internet penetration in Africa (34%) and social media penetration in Africa (15%) (Ibid.). However, the potential for growth in internet and social media use in East Africa is large, especially with significant investments in infrastructure and commerce from countries like China (Kiprop, 2017; Pilling, 2017). As such, counter-narrative campaigns should assess the realities of appropriate mediums in East Africa in the present, but also look to the future of technology that has the potential to expand in the region. Mediums useful for the East African context include:

FACE-TO-FACE ENGAGEMENT

In East Africa, radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism primarily take place offline, in face-to-face conversations and discussions (UNDP, 2017). With this in mind, messages may be best delivered in person, which means the key influencers in the region (such as youth leaders, teachers, parents etc.) need to be equipped with the knowledge and skills to refute messages of violent extremism in everyday conversation.

In addition to everyday conversation, face-to-face discussions can also take place in a semi-formal setting. For example, in some East African countries, the "maskani" is an informal gathering place where ideas are shared, a sort of neighborhood gathering place "where adult men [meet] after working hours to gossip, drink coffee and play bao (a kind of local chess)" (Bakari, 2001, p. 179). In the Tanzanian context, the "maskani" can be political, especially in Zanzibar, but also associated with gangs or drugs (Russell, 2017). In Kenya, the "maskani" is also associated with drug use (such as shisha or chewing Miraa¹²), but can also be tea houses or cold drink shops. In Tanzania, there is also a tendency for the "maskani" to be utilized by the older generation. On the other hand, in Kenya there is an inter-generational mix of people that socialize at the "maskani" (Russell, 2017). It should also be noted that the attendees of "maskani" gatherings tend to be men rather than women (Russell, 2017).



TELEVISION, FILM, AND CINEMA

Another medium that is useful for the East Africa region includes television, film and cinema. Where online mediums are not as successful, public film screenings that also are accompanied by audience participation or a facilitated discussion may have some impact on reducing violent extremist narratives. For example, the Watatu film tells the story of three men involved in violent extremism: Yusuf, Salim, and Jack. The Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSC) screens the film in forums of 200 youth in Mombasa, which is followed by a dialogue or facilitated discussion about the film and the outcomes.



¹² According to Russell (2017), Miraa is the traditional name for qat, a stimulant plant used frequently across the Horn of Africa.



RADIO PROGRAMS

Radio is one of the most significant channels of communication in East Africa (Russell, 2017; Sika et al., 2015). Radio programs are a primary means of communications about important social issues and provide a platform for governments and organizations to disseminate information about key causes such as gender-based violence, discrimination or health issues. Talk shows are successful in promoting citizen participation and reach people especially in rural areas that constitute three-quarters of East Africa's population (Sika et al., 2015, p. 23). Successful counter-messaging campaigns conducted on the radio may consider including some element of follow-up discussion directly in the community. For example, fostered by the Association of Media Women in Kenya, women in Kenya get together in small groups to listen to radio programs on topics of interest and discuss the ideas presented during the program amongst themselves (Orlale, 2015).



SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS

As previously mentioned, social media platforms are not as commonly utilized in East Africa when compared to the global penetration of social media. However, incorporating a social media element to counter-narrative campaigns can help to reach younger audiences, or supplement the campaign by providing an additional form of engagement. For example, in Kenya, a campaign was developed by Afrika Moja and the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism to raise awareness of violence in the community and to encourage youth to speak out about it, using the hashtag #ithurtsme. Another example is from Tanzania, where the Global Peace Foundation utilizes social media campaigns to accompany their events and programs such as the #AmaniKwanza (Peace is a Priority) or #VijanaNaAmani (Youth and Peace) campaigns.

THEATRE, ART, AND MUSIC

There have been a number of examples of interactive theatre shows and music festivals that promote tolerance, inclusivity, peace and community approaches to preventing violence. For example, the Anataban Collective in South Sudan utilizes theatre and art installations to speak out against the violence in South Sudan and to encourage the community to express "I am tired" of the violence (Campeanu, 2017). In Burundi, the Pamoja music festival, held on an annual basis in the region, promotes peace and social inclusion through Burundian Gospel music (Pamoja Festival, 2018). However, it should be noted that the experts at the workshop in Kigali pointed out that the theatre programs and music festivals have been criticized as only public entertainment, and that they have not shown any evidence that the messages are leading to positive change.



WEBSITES AND DISCUSSION FORUMS

While website and discussion forums are not very common yet in East Africa, there may be potential for their use in the future if the internet penetration increases in the region. However, in a study of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in East Africa, it was found that information provided on government and civil society websites was reported as out of date or could be found through other channels or sources (Sika et al., 2015). In this regard, websites and discussion forums are not a primary channel of communication in East Africa, and perhaps may only be utilized as supplemental to other platforms. One example out of East Africa of an online platform is www.ivomo.net where young people have discussions in a safe space about important issues and grievances in their communities.



SMS, MESSAGING APPS, AND TOLL-FREE NUMBERS

SMS over mobile phones is also an important channel of communication in East Africa, especially as a way of collecting information on governance issues and encouraging active citizenship participation (Sika et al., 2015). The active mobile connectivity in Eastern Africa is 61%, and WhatsApp is the most common messaging App utilized in East Africa, although Telegram and Facebook Messenger are also common (We Are Social and Hootsuite, 2018). This means that photos, messages, and videos that can be shared by SMS or WhatsApp might be an effective channel of communication for the region. It should also be noted that toll-free numbers are also a common way to invite public participation and discussions on an issue or to provide a “hotline” for additional information (Sika et al., 2015). In the East African context, SaSaa Media, a grassroots journalism initiative to generate positive and alternative narratives in Kenya, often utilizes messaging apps such as WhatsApp to share their content in a peer-to-peer style.



8 DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION

Next, a counter-narrative needs an associated campaign to help distribute the message. Some of the recommendations for strategic dissemination of messages include the below:



Determine the appropriate language(s) of the campaign and ensure the message will resonate in the local dialect. The original message is best delivered in the language that is as localized as possible but provides translation or subtitles for a broader reach.

Consider counter-narrative campaigns that include an element of audience participation and two-way communication between the messenger and the recipient. Campaigns with a feedback loop or an opportunity to discuss or debate the message may have more impact on the community and target audience.



Utilize short, concise messages that draw in the target audience as an entry point. Follow up with slightly longer messages and provide additional information and platforms for engagement when the target audience is interested.

Link the timing of the campaign to existing events already occurring in the community.



Supplement offline campaigns with an online presence to provide additional information. Consider including hashtags as part of the broader campaign and link to relevant websites and online resources.


9 EVALUATE THE IMPACT

Evaluating the impact of counter-narrative campaigns starts with linking back to the goals and objectives that were set in Step 4, and articulating the desired change of the campaign. Good evaluation of impact may also include ongoing monitoring and assessment of the campaign throughout pre-designated points on the campaign timeline. Monitoring, measurement, and evaluation of counter-narrative campaigns are important for several reasons:

WHY MONITOR, MEASURE AND EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF COUNTER-NARRATIVES?

- ✓ Ensures the message is being received by the target audience in an intended way.
- ✓ Ensures the message is achieving the goal or objective that leads to the desired change.
- ✓ Provides opportunities to alter the message to better fit the context.
- ✓ Provides information on how to better craft future campaigns.
- ✓ Provides feedback to donors or funders of the project for accountability.

Hedayah has developed a framework for monitoring, measurement, and evaluation (MM&E) of P/CVE programs that can also be applied to counter-narratives in East Africa (Mattei & Zeiger, 2018). While explaining the entire framework is outside the scope of this Guide, the basic steps for developing good MM&E can be described as follows:



The below sections will highlight some of the key components of this process for developing counter-narratives in more detail below. This should not be seen as a comprehensive framework, but guidance on how to better evaluate counter-narratives.

Identify Indicators

Good monitoring, measurement, and evaluation involved articulating the measure of change through clearly defined indicators that can be monitored and evaluated over time. As was outlined in Hedayah's previous How-To Guide for the Middle East and North Africa, there are three ways in which counter-narratives can be measured: awareness, engagement, and impact (El Sayed, Faris & Zeiger, 2017; Silverman, et. al, 2016). Some examples of indicators matched to a specific goal are outlined in the following case study:

Case Study on Indicator Development


In Country X, there is a problem with the radicalization of youth aged 13-18 for joining a violent extremist group, Group G, that raids the local Village Y, steals crops and resources, and kills innocent people through violent sacrificial rituals. Group G aims to take over Country X and institute a political system where their selected elite group is in control, with the authority of their Spirit Guide. Group G recruits young people by forcing them to commit petty crimes against their mothers, and then threatening to expose them if they do not carry out the wishes of Group G. Country X also has a significant social media reach, and Facebook and Twitter are commonly accessed through smartphones. Radio programs are also commonly listened to in Country X, especially amongst women in Village Y.

COUNTER-NARRATIVE PROGRAM

Counter-narrative developers decide to develop a campaign to raise awareness of the recruitment tactics by **Group G in Village Y in Country X** amongst mothers in the community. This will be done through three channels:

1. Public community discussions in spaces commonly frequented by women
2. Social media campaign video that uses the hashtag #CounterGroupG
3. Public service announcements and discussion forums on local radio channels

GOAL: Increase the number of mothers that are knowledgeable about Group G's recruitment tactics.



Collection of Data

Some of the relevant data collection methods for counter-narratives in the region may include:

- Face-to-face interviews or focus group discussions
- Surveys distributed through SMS or online platforms
- Keyword analysis of online comments or content
- Sentiment analysis of online comments or content

Resources for Evaluation

It is also important to evaluate what resources are available for data collection and evaluation. This could include time available for evaluation; funding; evaluator knowledge and training of the local context, collection methods, and MMSE frameworks; and technological tools for analysis.

ALTERNATIVE AND COUNTER-NARRATIVE CASE STUDIES FROM EAST AFRICA



CASE STUDY #1: "FUTURE LEADER" RADIO SHOW | Burundi

The "Future Leader" Radio Show is being run through a Radio station called: Radio COLOMBE, affiliated to an organization called Centre Jeunes KAMENGE. It is the First Radio of run by youth in Burundi, funded and supported by UNFPA country office. [Click here to view.](#)



1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

Push factors:

- Lack of education
- Access to jobs
- Corruption & benefits through the Ruling party
- Ethnic manipulation and history of conflict
- Sense of insecurity
- Reduced opportunity for alternative voice, exploring issues, dissent

Pull factors:

- Revenge for injustices
- Sense of power, respect
- Belonging to something
- Job and benefits of joining a rebel group

Enabling/Social Networks:

- "US vs. THEM" narrative of the government opposition

2. TARGET AUDIENCE

The target audience are 16-35 year old females and males in Bujumbura and the surrounding areas.

3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED

The violent extremist narrative being countered is that existing power structures for jobs and making life decisions are limited, and that there is no solution except for the use of violence against the State.

4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

The show has several aims:

- To provide an alternative voice to change mindsets and attitudes by shifting the conversation about issues relevant to youth. The show aims to introduce new ideas and approaches to problems young people are facing. For example, the show often highlights entrepreneurship and job opportunities.
- For young people to feel confident and self-belief in advancing their own life prospects.



5. MESSENGER

There are several relevant messengers for this program:

- Successful youth role models
- Youth radio hosts (peer-to-peer)
- Experts on peace and security

Youth role models and radio hosts serve as examples of credible messengers for other youth in Burundi, and they are able to discuss difficult topics and debate key issues because they are facing similar challenges and situations themselves.

6. CONTENT AND LOGIC

The core message is that if young people feel more self-reliant and agency to take of themselves they are more resilient to being involved in violence or any violent groups. The aim is increased self-reliance, awareness and knowledge through radio and online engagement and interaction with role models and experts.

Some of the subjects for discussion on-air include: human rights, jobs and livelihoods, how to do CVs, conflict resolution, how to stay safe, how to prevent violent extremism.

7. MEDIUMS

The primary medium is through a Radio show. The contents are also complemented by social media and online platforms and websites.

8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION

The radio hosts are trained on how to best facilitate the discussions, even when faced with challenging topics and debates brought up by youth. The facilitators are taught to steer the conversation to provide productive alternatives to violence or aggression.

The multi-faceted dissemination approach across platforms ensures that the main lessons learned on the Radio Show are supplemented by follow up discussions and interactions in social media and online platforms.

9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The metrics are mostly based on the scale and reach of the discussions:

- Number of people who participate in the phone-in shows
- Number of people who engage online – website and social media
- Number of radio shows aired

Qualitative metrics include the nature and number of testimonies, the range of discussion, viewpoints and voices involved, and level of interaction of participants that call into the show.



ANTI-TRIBALISM MOVEMENT

CASE STUDY #2: MOTHERS' FORUM | Somalia

This program by the Anti-Tribalism Movement creates a network of mothers in Mogadishu to prevent violent extremism through intervention and interaction with their sons. The program includes mothers who have lost their sons to Al Shabaab and can tell a powerful story about the dangers of violent extremism and terrorism, and the loss they suffered as a mother. The campaign takes a layered approach by targeting a key messenger through a counter-narrative campaign in terms of mother to mother as well as a secondary counter-recruitment campaign in the mother to son. One underlying assumption is that women feel empowered to speak out more against al Shabaab when other women with similar experiences are surrounding them with support and advice.

1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

Push factors:

- Youth unemployment
- Clan-based exclusion including political, economic and social exclusion
- Insecurity of individual, family and clan
- Environment of stress, violence and trauma
- Lack of justice structures

Pull factors:

- Claim of VE groups of Somali nationalism
- Family/clan protection
- Job opportunities

Enabling/Social Networks:

- Coercion to join

2. TARGET AUDIENCE

The target audience of the program is key influencers in the community, which are the mothers of at-risk youth in South and Central Somalia. The second target audience are the at-risk males, aged 14-30 years, that are the sons of those mothers.

3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED

The violent extremist narrative being countered is that the family will get income and protection from Al Shabaab, and that Al Shabaab will enable revenge or a sense of justice for grievances, especially acts of violence against the clan or family.

4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

This mothers' forums have the aim raise awareness among Somali mothers of the warning signs and provide suggestions for how the mothers might dissuade sons from joining. Some of the sub-goals include:

- Educating other mothers on risk and consequences of other sons joining Al Shabaab, especially the consequences of a loss of a son
- Educating mothers about the warning signs of a son who might join Al Shabaab
- Creating a network of mothers who can provide guidance, care and support on these issues
- Creating concerned citizens who are critically aware of the general impact of al Shabaab and violence.

5. MESSENGER

For this counter-narrative, the main messengers are the mothers of at-risk youth. They are trusted by the target audience (young Somali males) and have direct access and influence on the target audience.

It should be noted that there are several risks to the messenger, namely that the mother, by speaking out, becomes a target and overly exposed to physical risk from Al Shabaab. In addition, there is always the risk that the mother herself is sympathetic to the ideals of Al Shabaab and is not able to dissuade her son from joining.

6. CONTENT AND LOGIC

The logic of the main message to other mothers is that the mother is a key component of her son's life, and that she has the ability to intervene and speak out to prevent her son from joining a terrorist group. The mother has emotional appeal because she knows how to relate to her son in the most efficient way.

7. MEDIUMS

The primary point of dissemination for this message is in person through meetings of groups of mothers, and face-to-face between mother and son.

8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION

The Mothers' Forum features a network of other mothers where ideas can be shared and support systems can be created to encourage sustainability. The conversations occur in the local language (Somali), and meetings occur on a regular basis.

9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The activity was monitored or evaluated along the following indicators based on pre-post surveys:

- Mothers are more knowledgeable about warning signs of recruitment
- Mothers are more knowledgeable about alternative economic opportunities for their sons

The forums were also measured based on the growth of the network and the quality of interventions:

- The mothers' forums are growing in size (approx. 500 mothers who have been reached directly through this intervention after 2 years and there is now a core, ongoing network of 40-50 mothers)
- The forums are continuing weekly meetings in 3 main locations in Mogadishu with a larger network in the city
- There are some qualitative examples of successful defections from al Shabaab that were directly influenced by their mothers.



CASE STUDY #3: PROGRAM ON PREVENTING RADICALIZATION AND EXTREMISM LEADING TO TERRORISM (PRELT) | Somalia

This program is organized by the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCCA) as part of their efforts to undermine religious extremist narratives in Somalia. A similar program is also being run in the Nigerian context.

1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

Push factors:

- Presence of ongoing conflict and violence in Somalia
- Lack of religious knowledge
- Unemployment
- Illiteracy

Enabling/Social Networks:

- Attractiveness of Extremist Narratives and Charisma of Extremist Leaders

Pull factors:

- False Promises (After life Reward, Group Identity, Saving the Muslim Ummah, etc.)
- Salvation from an Unjust and Corrupt society/ government.

2. TARGET AUDIENCE

The target audience are key influencers in the community, namely **women, youth and traditional leaders**.

3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED

This counter-narrative tackles three main narratives of violent extremists (Al Shabaab):

- False Interpretation of Jihad
- Misinterpretation of other Islamic Concepts (Takfir, Hakimiya, Jahiliyya)
- Misconceptions about the life of the Prophet and Companions

4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

This mothers' forums have the aim raise awareness among Somali mothers of the warning signs and provide suggestions for how the mothers might dissuade sons from joining. Some of the sub-goals include:

- Analyzing the local context and the individual pathways to radicalization,
- Detecting attempts for radicalization,
- Understanding the elements of radical and extremist narratives, and
- Acquiring the necessary tools and skills to craft and deliver an alternative narrative – using moderate Islamic teachings – so that communities would be able to contribute to preventing radicalization and extremism.

5. MESSENGER

The primary messenger (trainer) is a research and training center (CCCPA) with religious authority and connectedness to Al Azhar.

The key influencers trained in this program subsequently become the messengers. Here the community are credible because:

- They understand the complexity of the context and the effective means of delivering the counter narrative.
- They are credible and trusted.
- They are able to influence their circles and disseminate an alternative message.

6. CONTENT AND LOGIC

The content of the training course provides participants with:

- Tools to explore and understand the context of conflict, depicting how and why radicalization occurs within it and identifying the points of intervention for participants.
- An understanding of Islamic Law (Sharia), and addressing several Islamic concepts most notably Jihad, Takfir, Hakimiyya and Jahiliyya.
- An understanding how terrorist narratives and messages are constructed, including the way they frame the conflict and how they implicate religion in it, through "content analysis" of propaganda material (videos, speeches, and publications) of terrorist organizations.
- Tools to formulate their very own alternative, positive and inclusive messages of peace and tolerance that are rooted in a holistic understanding of Islamic traditions, founded on the correct and moderate interpretation of Islamic Sharia.
- A set of skills to be able to deliver these inclusive messages. This would include active listening, communication and leadership skills, dialoguing and the ability to form a coherent, persuasive argument.

7. MEDIUMS

The trainings primarily take place in a face-to-face setting. The content of the trainings could then be used by participants in schools, social gatherings and other online and offline platforms.

8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION

Some of the strategies for dissemination include:

- Alternative, Inclusive messages are crafted during the training and afterwards
- They are disseminated in the local language of the participants and according to their context.
- They are disseminated across the circles of influence of the participants in their workplaces, homes, social settings.

9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

- Pre and Post Tests are conducted during the training to evaluate the knowledge before and after the training.
- Focus Groups are conducted right after the training to acquire feedback from trainees.
- Monitoring their progress and impact after 3 months, 6 months and a year.



CASE STUDY #4: YOUNG FAITH LEADERS | Uganda

This program by Allied Muslim Youth Uganda (AMYU) supports the knowledge and skills of young faith leaders to prevent violence and promote trust and relationship building by fostering dialogue among young people of different faith communities in Uganda.

It is part of the wider AMYU CVE projects that target students and youthful clerics who are most likely to influence their peers to build interfaith coalitions on secular and religious campuses and also develop social media campaigns or community events that promote tolerance and interfaith dialogue.

1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

Push factors:

- Lack of interfaith competence
- Marginalization
- Lack of religious knowledge
- Lack of role models or positive figures

Pull factors:

- Sense of belonging
- Sense of identity and self-esteem

Enabling/Social Networks:

- Charisma of Extremist Leaders and Attractiveness of Online Narratives

2. TARGET AUDIENCE

The target audience for this program are key influencers in the community through young clerics from different faiths. The target audience of the message is the general youth population of Uganda (16-35).

3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED

This counter-narrative targets the isolationist rhetoric of "US" vs "THEM" between Christians and Muslims. It also undercuts messages of intolerance or hatred towards other faiths.

4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

The goal is to equip young clerics with the tools to promote interfaith dialogue, tolerance and cooperation amongst each other and build resilience against violent extremist narratives.



5. MESSENGER

The messenger of the program is AMYU staff and select, trained credible youthful clerics from different religious backgrounds. The founder, Nuwagaba Muhsin Kaduyu, has significant credibility amongst the young Muslim population in Uganda as a young cleric himself. Once the young clerics have been trained and mentored on the key components of interfaith dialogue and collaboration, the messenger is the young cleric that has the skills to influence other members of his own faith to act with tolerance towards others, and to serve as a role model.

6. CONTENT AND LOGIC

The core message is that Muslims and Christians can live together, cooperate with each other and support each other in the community.

7. MEDIUMS

The message is distributed through several main mediums:

- Social media (Facebook & Twitter)
- Radio (talk shows by young clerics)
- Television or public service announcements by young clerics
- Events or face to face engagement (e.g. Interfaith Walks)
- Meeting spaces
- Training workshops

8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION

The campaign is distributed in the local languages as well as English. The various forms of the message are also accompanied by capacity building and mentorship from AMYU on a regular basis. The AMYU network takes advantage of new and existing community outreach programs, and also encourages the young clerics to disseminate their messages on their own platforms, such as during Friday Sermons or Sunday Sermons.

9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

This program has been measured by:

- Number of interfaith activities carried out by trainees
- Number of online and offline narratives developed by the clerics through social media and other platforms.

CASE STUDY #5: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE | Kenya

This program run by the Community Development Initiative in Eastleigh, Kenya, and looks at how economic private sector can contribute to countering grievances found in the radicalization process.

1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

Push factors:

- Poverty
- Unemployment
- Unfair resource allocation (between communities) and lack of job opportunities

Pull factors:

- Sense of identity
- Economic empowerment

2. TARGET AUDIENCE

The target audience of this project was for the benefit of disillusioned youth in Eastleigh, Kenya 14 – 25 year olds, male and female.

3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED

The violent extremist narrative being countered are two-fold:

- Ethnic discrimination and xenophobia – something that would have been exploited by VEOs or communities that were endangered of being divided following the Westgate attack
- Lack of economic opportunities and unfair distribution of jobs in the Eastleigh community

4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

The goals of the counter-narrative are to:

- Prevent discrimination between ethnic groups
- Prevent divisions between businesses and radicalized youth (community partnerships)
- Provide alternative action through youth engagement in national conversations
- Provide alternative action through allowing economic opportunities and partnerships to develop

5. MESSENGER

The main messenger is the Eastleigh Business Community Association (EBCA) engaging with the local youth population. They are a trusted and respected association within the community, and give credibility to the job market in Eastleigh.

6. CONTENT AND LOGIC

The message emphasizes that the business community in Eastleigh cares about the future of its youth by providing job opportunities and making relevant connections for new jobs. The secondary message is that youth deserve to be heard by the greater community, including the private sector and government officials.

7. MEDIUMS

This program is delivered by the Community Development Initiative through:

- Face-to-face interactions between youth and EBCA
- Television, radio and social media campaigns around EBCA's actions and proactive programs

8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION

The program requires a good partnership between the community and the private sector, which is managed by EBCA. The messages are disseminated in English and Swahili through various media channels, but mostly taking place in offline conversations and job fairs.

9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The program is measured through the following indicators:

- Youth attendance at organized activities.
- Social media engagement with messages about what EBCA were doing.
- Youth were updating local administrator about potential levels of violence.
- Frequency of the business community involved in other meetings

It should be noted here that one of the local 'super power' gangs participated in this activity because it attracted their attention. This was seen as a success because it was reaching the target audience of youth that were vulnerable to exhibiting violent behavior.



CASE STUDY #6: SASAA MEDIA | Kenya

Sasaa Media is a project that enables young people in Kenya to get involved in a variety of creative activities. It is a program run by grassroots youth journalists, and managed through YADEN East Africa. The program features training workshops on producing content as well as platforms where that content can be shared after it is produced.

1. PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

Push factors:

- Unmet aspirations
- Authorities not listening to youth / lack of 'power of expression'

Pull factors:

- Sense of identity and purpose
- Economic empowerment

2. TARGET AUDIENCE

The main target audience of the campaign is young people in Kenya who are at a personal crossroads aged 14-27, both females and males. However, the communications aspect of the project also worked with key influencers within the neighborhood in terms of several youth leaders.

3. NARRATIVE BEING COUNTERED

The main violent extremist narrative being countered is that youth's voices aren't heard and that youth 'aren't worth it' ("Accounting for, and making every youth count." Violent extremist organizations like Al Shabaab can give a sense of belonging, meaning and worth to the young people of Kenya, so this message aims to undercut that claim and provide alternatives.

4. GOAL OF THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE

The goal of this campaign is to give the target audience a sense of meaning, purpose and belonging. This includes providing alternative action through positive activities and promoting a relationship between youth and government officials to develop constructive change.



5. MESSENGER

The main messengers are the local neighborhood personalities (leaders) to deliver the counter-narrative. The messengers are trusted, emotional, and have personal connections with the community.

6. CONTENT AND LOGIC

There are many strands to this project and each has a different core message. They are summarized as:

- Creative process: journalistic activity – improves critical thinking amongst youth leaders
- Creative process: video production – trusted with equipment
- Creative process: music creation – creative outlet for grievances
- Creative process: general objective of expressing views and getting involved
- Hang outs: promotes positive interaction between youth & group dynamics

<https://bit.ly/2JcUr0t>
<https://bit.ly/2JcNPPK>



7. MEDIUMS

There are several main mechanisms for delivery:

- Offline (hang outs, workshops for creating the product)
- Online, through social media channels (Facebook, YouTube)
- Peer-to-peer dissemination (WhatsApp – infiltrating closed networks)

8. STRATEGY FOR DISSEMINATION

The program includes a production team and implementers that help to create the content as well as a neighborhood liaison that is important for tailoring the content to the context. The content is distributed across many channels appropriate for each medium (for example, CDs for music produced). The language used is Swahili, in the local dialect.

9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The message was monitored in the following ways:

- Number of times songs or videos were shared on private networks
- How many people are inspired and create their own videos and music outside of direct Sasaa Media involvement
- Attendance at hangouts, and number of hangouts

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ANNEX

Annex A

About the Project

Annex B

Counter-Narrative Details

ANNEX A: ABOUT THE PROJECT

This project serves to expand Hedayah’s Counter-Narratives Library by adding a collection that focuses on East Africa as a region. This project aims to collate, collect and analyze counter-narratives in various local languages. The project as a whole, including the steps outlined below, is funded by the U.S. Department of State.

The project consisted of several main steps:

An “Expert Workshop on Counter-Narratives for CVE in East and Horn of Africa,”

held from 5–7 February in Kigali, Rwanda by Hedayah and the IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE).



The development of this “How-To Guide” for the region that includes:

elements of good practice and examples of counter/alternative narratives resonant in the region



A regional collection of counter-narratives as a distinct component in Hedayah’s online Counter-Narratives Library.

About the Counter-Narratives Library

As part of its efforts to develop better practices and strategies for counter-narratives, Hedayah launched its Counter-Narratives Library in October 2016. The Library is a comprehensive portal where governments, practitioners and civil society can access content, toolkits and good practices to counter the narratives of all forms of violent extremism. The password-protected Library includes videos, movies, TV shows, cartoons, books, websites, magazines, blogs, social media campaigns, news articles and many other examples of counter-narratives.

The original collection focused on open-source counter-narratives to Al Qaeda. At the time, the project was supported by 8 countries, led by the government of the Netherlands, and handed over to Hedayah in July 2015. Prior to the launch of the East Africa collection, the Library features two regional collections (South East Asia and MENA), and one thematic (Daesh Defectors).

The key objectives of the counter-narrative library are to:

- **Establish** a comprehensive resource where governments, practitioners and civil society can access relevant information used to counter the narratives of all forms of violent extremism
- **Amplify** existing narratives against violent extremists
- **Promote** good practice sharing and provide practitioners with relevant resources and tools to counter the narrative of violent extremists

Hedayah’s Counter-Narrative Library can be found at www.cn-library.com. For more information about the Library, contact CNLibrary.Admin@hedayah.ae.

ANNEX B: COUNTER-NARRATIVES

The contents of Annex B are not available to the general public in order to protect the messengers and messages of the counter-narratives identified in the Annex. If you are interested in obtaining a copy of the full report [including Annex B], kindly send an email to info@hedayah.ae with your name, contact details, reason for access and credentials. Hedayah reserves the right to refuse access to Annex B to any individual or organization for any reason.

The contents of Annex B are also available in Hedayah's Counter-Narrative Library. For those interested in accessing the Counter-Narrative Library, kindly contact the administrator at cnlibrary.admin@hedayah.ae.

ABOUT HEDAYAH

Hedayah was created in response to the growing desire from members of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and the wider international community for the establishment of an independent, multilateral center devoted to dialogue and communications, capacity building programs, research and analysis to counter violent extremism in all of its forms and manifestations.

During the ministerial-level launch of the GCTF in New York in September 2011, the UAE offered to serve as the host of the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism. In December 2012 Hedayah was inaugurated with its headquarters in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

Hedayah aims to be the premier international center for expertise and experience to counter violent extremism by promoting understanding and sharing good practice to effectively serve as the true global center to counter violent extremism.



Hedayah
countering violent extremism