

# **Local Drivers and Dynamics of Youth Radicalisation in Bangladesh**



**Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies**  
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**Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS)**

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## Preface

The rise of religious radicalisation leading to terrorism has risen in Bangladesh in recent times. The country was founded on the basis of religious harmony and diverseness of ethnicity and culture, a unique characteristic among Muslim majority countries. In recent years, Bangladesh has suffered from transnational extremism, which has crept into the very fabric of the society. In recent years' violent extremism is a result of Islamist radicalisation considered as one of the major concerns in Bangladesh. After the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in July 2016, the depth of violent extremism in Bangladesh unearthed the depth of extremists' influence in our society. Bangladesh has also seen random acts of terrorism perpetrated by young people throughout the country.

In order to understand what trends that conspired to radicalisation in the secular value oriented Bengali society that long cherished communal harmony, a study was conducted to identify the drivers as well as local dynamics that are behind the radical upheaval of a certain section of the youth in the society. A survey was conducted to find out the actors, conditions and perception of the youth towards radicalisation that is prevailing in the society.

The study found the radicalisation process had gone through an evolutionary path. Generations of extremist have contributed to the spread of radicalisation, enriching their combat experience and benefited from extension of their worldwide network throughout years. The knowledge of tactical disposition, command and control structure, and establishment of the cell structure—all acquired through network of Jihadists. This study on the radicalisation has identified multi generational link of Jihad that slowly found its way to Bangladesh.

The in-depth study of history of radical Jihad shows that, first generation extremists were those who have joined the Soviet- Afghan war during 1979-1992 periods and have created Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islam (HUJI) in Bangladesh. The second generation appeared in 1996 with

the advancement of the organization named 'Qital Fi-Sabilillah'. This organization transformed into 'Jamayat-ul-Mujahedin Bangladesh' (JMB) in 1998 which was deeply connected with HUJI. The third generation of Islamist radicalisation started from 2001, through the group known as Hizbut Tahrir. As the evolution continued, the fourth generation of extremists commenced in 2007 through the group known as Jamatul Muslemin which later began to function as 'Ansarulah Bangla Team'. The groups were influenced by ideologue Anwar Alwaki and recently claimed to represent al Qaeda in Bangladesh under the name of Ansar AlIslam. Emergence of ISIS signals evolution of the fifth generation extremists. This generation is affiliated with the ideology of ISIS and shares similarities of the first generation extremists as they both migrated to fight on a foreign land. In 2015, the JMB split into broad two groups, one was the older JMB and the new one who left the JMB for some ideological reason has come to be known as Neo-JMB. This new group claims that they represent the Bangladesh chapter of IS. All extremists groups tend to be home grown but they may have connections with international terrorist groups. The fifth generation of extremists is educated youth group, identified in 2015; to be pursuing their objective of establishing an Islamic state in Bangladesh. Very recently they led the most unprecedented savagery in Bangladesh during the holy month of Ramadan in 2016. That brutal incidence was realized in a restaurant at Dhaka's diplomatic zone by a group of 5 young attackers who extinguished the lives of 29 people, including 20 hostages (18 foreigners and 2 locals).

Radical groups are targeting youth to carry out their agendas. The process of radicalisation takes times as indoctrination, motivation and initiation in the group done through multiple phases. Thus the key focus for all the existing terrorist groups is to radicalise, recruit and use the youth for carrying out terror attacks. The advantages in targeting the youth into joining terrorist groups are many and terrorists are displaying increased capability and capacity in enlisting them. For instance, youths with no prior police records are especially sought after by these groups as they allow terrorist and violent extremist groups more operational freedom by reducing the likelihood of arrest of the more senior leaders. Youths are also, at times, given more dangerous tasks on the assumption that if they are caught they would receive lighter sentences due to their age. There is also the possibility that young adults are targeted because of

their skills, which will be helpful for the cause. The research data clearly indicate that youth are the most vulnerable group for the radicalisation.

The study found that the majority of the participants felt that the actors of radicalisation are from foreign land or influenced by the foreign powers. Others believe that political parties also play a role in the radicalisation process. The study also revealed that a number of variables involved in the youth radicalisation ranging from motivation, actors, and perception and means of radicalisation—all contribute to the process of the youth radicalisation.

The report has its limitations. The study was conducted at Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh comprising people from diverse background for this study. It should be noted that the majority of the terrorists involved in recent attacks came from the universities based in Dhaka. Considering the resources for the study and the opportunity of access the study area covered both North and South City Corporation of Dhaka metropolitan areas. Feedbacks from the senior level official from the law enforcement were taken as they are involved in the de-radicalisation process.

Two different methodologies were followed in the study. The study combines both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative approach was conducted through a survey by using a structured questionnaire of variables, measured with numbers and analyzed with statistical procedures, to explore the youth perception on local drivers for radicalisation. A qualitative approach, which included Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) was used to explore how different groups including law enforcement agencies, education institutions, family, society etc play a role in preventing violent extremism. Additionally, secondary data was collected through a view of existing literature.

The study also found that the awareness about the radicalisation is growing. Many are now familiar with the terms such as militancy, terrorism and radicalisation in Bangladesh. It is also found that the majority of the respondents reject the radicalisation or radical political agendas. According to the study, the process of radicalisation lies deep within the transnational ideology of Jihad. It is also perceived that the feeling of marginalization of the greater community of Islamic Ummah is encouraging even socially affluent people to get involved in Jihad.

The research data also unveils the role of the online radicalisation. The ease and affordability of internet on the advent of smart phone apps, the convergence of different forms of media—all geared towards youth consumers. The rise of the social media has given the terror organizations unique opportunities to collaborate distribute and propagate radical agendas all over the world. The study also indicates that the religious institutions have a role to play as the institutions have to find a way to convey the true teachings of Islam. The religious institutions need to explain that religion does not approve of radical activities. The findings of the study indicate that there should be sustained discussions for not supporting radical activities, even if it is in the name of religion. Media also has a role to counter the messages of violent extremism. The policy recommendations for Mass Media include programs for awareness and constructive activities. Media can aware people by exposing the destructive aspects of radicalisation. Policy recommendation also includes the role of the stake holders, for instance, the government endorsed campaigns that could contribute to de-radicalisation process in the country. The government may introduce information campaigns for de-radicalisation or counter-radicalisation which should be highly accessible and targeted to different segments of society. International development partners may contribute to uniquely design programs that could facilitate de-radicalisation. Similarly, Bangladesh can benefit from the similar experiences from other countries regarding radicalisation and de-radicalisation process. International cooperation has to be sought from countries that are facing similar problems of radicalisation.

As each country is unique, the problems experienced would differ greatly from one country to another. The radicalisation that led to terrorism or violent extremism in Bangladesh is unique. This is why it is impossible to design and implement effective counter measure programs without identifying the local drivers or socio-cultural dynamics of a society. The kind of radicalisation Bangladesh witnessed recently is fueled by the ideologies. The ideologies cannot be eliminated only through effective means of law enforcement. Real interpretation of Islamic teaching could be a potent weapon against the radicalisation that can effectively combat this problem. More research on this particular subject would give us much needed insight on the chronic problem of radicalisation we are currently facing in our society.

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## List of Abbreviations

AI	:	Ansar Al-Islam
ABT	:	Ansarullah Bangla Team
CS	:	Case Study
CTTC	:	Counter Terrorism & Transnational Crime
EV	:	Extremist Violence
FGD	:	Focus Group Discussions
HT	:	Hizbut Tahrir
HUJI	:	Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami
IS	:	Islamic State
JI	:	Jamaat-e-Islami
JMB	:	Jagroto Muslim Bahini
KII	:	Key Informant Interview
ICLDS	:	Institute of Conflict, Law & Development Studies
LeT	:	Lashkar-e-Taiba
RAB	:	Rapid Action Battalion
R&D Cell	:	Research and Development cell
SUS	:	Sabolomby Udyuan Songhta
UN	:	United Nations
UP	:	Union Parishad
USA	:	United States of America

## **Executive Summary**

In recent years, violent extremism as a result of Islamist radicalisation is one of the major concerns in Bangladesh. After the ‘Holey Artisan Bakery attack’ in July 2016, the depth of violent extremism in Bangladesh unearthed the depth of penetration by the extremists of the society. Bangladesh has also seen random acts of terrorism perpetrated by young people.

The rise of religious radicalisation leading to terrorism has increased in Bangladesh in recent times. It has become a major concern in Bangladesh since the incidence of nationwide serial bomb blasts in 2005. Bangladesh experienced an upsurge in support for Islamist extremism between 1999 and 2005. An influx of already radicalised groups, such as returning veterans of the Afghan war and migrant workers from abroad, influenced public opinion, as did events on the world stage, particularly US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and events in Palestine, which has fueled radicalism and anti-western sentiment of mostly Islamist political groups, radical or otherwise.

There are several local and internationally linked Islamist terrorist groups operating in Bangladesh. Among them, ISIS and Al-Qaeda both claim their presence in Bangladesh and are believed to be cooperating with local terror groups in order to recruit and carry out domestic attacks. Besides those, other terror groups operating in Bangladesh are ISIS-affiliated JMB, a Bangladeshi terror group founded in 1998, as well as the Al-Qaeda affiliated Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), reported to be formed in 2007.

The key focus for all the existing terrorist groups is to radicalise, recruit and use young people for their stated (and unstated) objectives. The advantages in targeting the youth into joining terrorist groups are many and terrorists are displaying increased capability and capacity in enlisting them. For instance, youths with no prior police records are especially sought after by these groups as they allow terrorist and violent

extremist groups more operational freedom by reducing the likelihood of arrest of the more senior terrorist leaders. It is estimated that youths between 15 to 18 years make up about 20 per cent of all suicide bombers and terrorist groups. Groups who have suffered losses in terms of their members captured or killed, often times are forced to recruit youths as much of the adult population are simply too weary for conflict and are reluctant to continue the struggle. Youths are also, at times, given more dangerous tasks on the assumption that if they are caught they would receive lighter sentences due to their age. There is also the possibility that young adults are targeted because of the skills that they might possess to ensure a cadre of educated and technically savvy future leaders for terrorist attacks.

Ignorance of religious teaching opposed to violence makes youth more vulnerable and susceptible to recruitment. Religious institutions have the potential to capture the mind of the young people with misconstrued interpretation of religion. These youths are manipulated into believing that they are actually struggling for a nobler and worthy cause, with the assurance of victory in this world and in the Hereafter. Besides the religious institutes, education institutes especially universities and institutions of higher learning are also being turned into recruiting pools for terrorists.

## **Objectives**

The purpose of this study was to investigate local drivers and dynamics of radicalisation in Bangladesh. The key objectives of the study were as follows:

- Study/analyze the dynamics of youth radicalisation in Bangladesh
- Identify the key drivers of violent extremism in Bangladesh
- Identify the techniques/pathways of ISIL recruitment in Bangladesh
- Recommend key interventions that can prevent radicalisation drivers and extremist recruitment in Bangladesh

This study aimed to enhance knowledge on Bangladeshi youth's perspective of violent extremism. This research will help to guide the

concerned government agencies to revisit their policies about the role of youths in violent extremism. In this context, the potential users of the study would be policy makers, law enforcement groups, administration and government officials, academicians, and intelligence organizations, local and beyond.

## **Methodology**

The study combines both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative approach was conducted through a survey by using a structured questionnaire of variables, measured with numbers and analyzed with statistical procedures, to explore the youth perception on local drivers for radicalisation. A qualitative approach, which included Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) was used to explore how different groups including law enforcement agencies, education institutions, guardians/family, society etc. play a role in preventing violent extremism. Additionally, secondary data was collected through a view of existing literature.

The study area covered both North and South City Corporation of Dhaka (Dhaka Metropolitan Areas). The total numbers of individual respondents were 173 from both public and private educational institutes. The age group was 15 to 30 years old as determined by Bangladesh's youth policy.

## **Major Findings**

### **Familiarity with the Concept and Source of Knowledge**

Among the respondents, 68% are familiar with militancy, 30% with terrorism and 2% have heard of extremism. Television has the highest responses as the source for this familiarity (48.3%) along with newspapers (35.2%).

### **Actors of radicalisation**

The sample survey indicates that 39% referred to foreign powers as the main actor for facilitating radicalisation and 33.1% held that local



political parties were responsible. The case of a religious group as the actor of radicalisation was polled by 22% of the youth.

### **Views on Radicalisation**

Among the respondent, 86% said that radicalisation is bad and 14% said that they do not know whether it is good or bad. Among them, 41% were of the opinion that radicalisation created chaos in the society. According to 40% of the respondents, radicalisation created a negative image of the country internationally, while 15% responded that it is an obstacle to the development of the country.

### **Reasons for Radicalisation**

Religious extremism in Bangladesh is often connected with global extremism at least as an ideological factor. Suffering from a sense of inequalities among the different community members of the Bangladeshi society viewed Islamist militancy to be caused by a complex web of domestic, regional and international events and dynamics in Bangladesh. A feeling of marginalization as a greater community of *Islamic Ummah* is encouraging even socially affluent people to get involved in 'Jihad'.

### **Type of Educational Institute Where Most Youths were Radicalised**

Among the respondents, 50% of them said that youth from the private universities were involved in the process of radicalisation, *Kammi* madrasah as an incubator was opined by 14%. However, 13% said that there are no specific institutions where youths are engaged with radicalisation, as from all kinds of institutions youths were involved in radicalisation.

### **Reasons for the youth to engage more with radicalisation**

While asking for reasons why youths are involved with radicalisation, 62.9% of the respondents were of the opinion that youths are convinced by others very easily. Radicalised persons are presented as role models for the youths according to 18.5% of the respondents.

Moreover, 12.1% responded that youths are involved in radicalisation leading to terrorism because they are likely to be more violent.

### **Means and approach of radicalisation**

Ideological influence is the most powerful mean to engage youth in radicalisation, as mentioned by nearly 40%, while 33.1% responded that social media is the forum to engage them. The temptation of well-being in the Hereafter, in other words, desire to go to heaven in the afterlife is another temptation for getting involved in the lure of radicalisation.

### **Use of Internet in Radicalisation**

The Internet as the most powerful media to motivate the young population to radicalisation was mentioned by 61% of the respondents. Mostly, 29% said that different Facebook pages are a strong tool to involve the youth. Jihadi blogs/websites are mentioned by 26%. Ideological blogs/websites was mentioned by 24%. Various links are sent in support of radicalisation via Facebook was mentioned by 14%. Most of the respondents (73%) mentioned that they have no direct experience regarding radical activities through the internet. The indirect invitation (off- line) has been received by 9% of the respondents. Another 9% mentioned that they received ideological/jihadi links through the internet.

### **Prevention and the way-out of radicalisation**

About half of the respondents (51%) said that awareness raising could prevent the youth from engaging to violent extremism/militancy. Moral education can prevent the same, said 35% of the respondents. Data shows that 27% argued for social and political unity while 25% were in favor of raising awareness about radicalisation as the way-out of radicalisation. Reducing unemployment was mentioned as a way out by 19% and 10% said awareness rising through educational institutions could be another way out of radicalisation.

## Recommendations

**Law enforcement agencies:** Law enforcement agencies need to bolster **monitoring and surveillance** in their assigned areas. They need to ensure the **punishment** of terrorists who are apprehended. The criminal justice authorities can take initiatives for a **remedial correction** of the deviants.

**Education institutions:** Teachers can **monitor** the activities and behavior of students. Educational institutions can take programs for **awareness raising** about the harmful impacts of radicalisation. Besides the class, teaching institutes could arrange programs where a space could be created to address radical activities. Educational institutions could emphasis on vocational education so that the learners do not frustrate about their future job and employment prospects. Educational institutes can play the main role in **building a knowledge-based and progressive society** through education. Inclusive education would build the mind of a child to respect all religions and segments of society.

**Family:** Parents and guardians need to **monitor** the activities and behavior of their children. The family could play a significant role in creating awareness among the youth about militant activities. Quality time with children is essential for family bonding. Attention to their problems, accountability, effective communication among family members. **Leadership in the family** could help to build ideology; help the children to understand the facts or situation rather punishing them for their deviations.

**Religious institutions:** Religious institutes can play a role by providing **authentic religious education** and not to provoke anyone to radicalisation. During discussions on religion in mosques especially in *Khutba at Jumma Prayer* (Friday congregation), extremism should not be encouraged.

**Explanation about violent extremism and militancy:** The religious institutions need to explain that religion does not approve of radical activities. There should be sustained discussions for not supporting radical activities, even if it is in the name of religion. They could discuss the bad effects on society and punishment in the religion for harmful radical activities.

**Mass media:** Mass media should produce programs and writings for **awareness and constructive activities**. They can aware people by exposing the destructive aspects of radicalisation. The Media should not broadcast news that makes people **panic**. They can help by **acting impartially** and by revealing the true nature of radical Islam.

### **Policy Makers**

The government may introduce and emphasize on information campaigns for **de-radicalisation or counter-radicalisation** which should be highly accessible and targeted for different segments of society. **International cooperation** has to be sought from countries that are facing a similar situation. Development of pool of information, its updating and collaboration of effort is important as it is a global issue. A shift from this **exclusion approach to inclusion** is crucial to prevent young people from engaging with extremism.

Finally, collective and comprehensive efforts of the people of this society to prevent and protect against militancy is essential. If it takes an entire village to educate a child, then it takes an entire nation to prevent radicalisation.

## Introduction

Bangladesh is the world's seventh most populous country and the third largest Muslim majority country<sup>1</sup>. In recent years violent extremism as a result of radicalisation is one of the major concerns in Bangladesh. After the 'Holey Artisan Bakery attack' in July 2016 the depth of violent extremism in Bangladesh unearthed the depth of penetration by the extremists of the society

While Bangladeshi society is known for promoting openness and co-existence of differing thoughts and opinions, violence of different types has also been an integral part of its history. Violent activities in Bangladesh were found recently with an increasingly religious character which echoes international trends in terrorism. But in Bangladesh, this category of violence has precedents. Between 1999 and 2005 the country was wrecked by hitherto unprecedented levels of violence perpetrated mainly by radical Islamists, causing widespread fears that Bangladesh was on the cusp of becoming a failed state and a bastion for jihadist forces with links to Al Qaeda and similar outfits bent on perpetrating global jihad<sup>2</sup>. Prior to this escalation, violence carried out in the name of Islam last rocked the country on 25 August 2005, with an attack that struck 62 of its 64 districts. The perpetrators, of the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamist group Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMB) were soon apprehended after the attacks<sup>3</sup>. Home-grown **extremist** outfits have received ideological and tactical supports from transnational terrorist network such as Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), but only in a limited manner.<sup>4</sup> In 2014 ISIS

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<sup>1</sup> USAID (2012). violent extremism and insurgency in Bangladesh A risk assessment. Available at: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PA00JSHS.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JSHS.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> *ibid*

<sup>3</sup> Yasmin, L., (2016). The Fall and Rise Of Extremism In Bangladesh. Available at: <http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/bangladesh/fall-and-rise-extremism-bangladesh>

<sup>4</sup> Khan, S.E. (2017). Bangladesh: The Changing Dynamics of Violent Extremism and the Response of the State. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Volume 28, Issue 1. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2016.1266127>

announced its presence in Bangladesh, although Government of Bangladesh and its law enforcement agencies denied this claim.

## **Radicalisation in Bangladesh**

Democracy and Secularism was a foundational tenet of Bangladesh's constitution<sup>5</sup>. Traditionally Bangladesh promoted an inclusive secular and tolerant Islam and historically enjoyed positive relations between its four major faith communities e.g. Muslim, Hindu, Christian and Buddha<sup>6</sup>.

'Major religious festivals are marked by national holidays and celebrated in an atmosphere of relative tolerance, with the main religions sharing many rituals in common. Therefore, Bangladesh has not experienced any major religious unrest and, historically, relatively only a few people have been attracted to any violent extremist ideology.'<sup>7</sup>

The rise of religious radicalisation leading to extreme terrorism has increased in Bangladesh at the present time. It has become a major concern in Bangladesh since the incidence of nationwide serial bomb blasts in 2005<sup>8</sup>. It may not possible to estimate of the Islamist terrorist groups operating in Bangladesh because these groups change names or members from time to time but the presence of seventy Islamist militant outfits with thousands of militant members was identified during 1999-2010<sup>9</sup>.

Bangladesh experienced an upsurge in support for Islamist violent extremism between 1999 and 2005. An influx of already radicalised

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<sup>5</sup> The Constitution of The People's Republic Of Bangladesh Article 12: Secularism and freedom of religion. Available at: [http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/sections\\_detail.php?id=367&sections\\_id=24560%7CSection](http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/sections_detail.php?id=367&sections_id=24560%7CSection)

<sup>6</sup> H. El-Said (2012): *De-radicalizing Islamists: Program and their Impact in Muslim Majority States*, <http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1328200569ElSaidDeradicalisation1.pdf>, accessed on 19 December 2016.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid*

<sup>8</sup> Rahman, M. A. & Kashem, M. B. (2011). Understanding religious militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. Dhaka: ICA Bangladesh.

<sup>9</sup> Rahman, M.A. (2016). The Forms and Ecologies of Islamist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. Journal for Deradicalisation, Summer 2016 Issue [ONLINE] Available at <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/58/49>

groups, such as returning veterans of the Afghan war and migrant workers from abroad, influenced public opinion, as did events on the world stage, particularly US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and events in Palestine, which has fueled radicalism and anti-western sentiment of mostly Islamic political groups, radical or otherwise.<sup>10</sup>

Bangladesh also witnessed left-wing extremism and ethnic militancy since its independence in 1971. There was an effort to gather support from extreme leftist to extreme rightist ideology. Some of the well-known left-wing parties were Purba Bangla Communist Party (PBCP), Red Flag, Gono Mukti Fouz (GMF), Biplobi Community Party, Sarbahara Party, Janajuddho, Gono Bahini, etc. But these groups have diluted over time due to lack of popular support and marginalization.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, there was a spurt in the activities of the left wing militant group PBCP found even in the beginning of 2002. The Violence of Parbatya Chattagram Jana Shanghatti Samiti (PCJSS) in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in the name of land and ethnicity continued up to the signing of the peace accord in 1997. Currently, there is a growing trend of violence in the remote areas of the CHT which involve various indigenous groups active in the area.<sup>12</sup>

Air Cdr (Retd.) Ishfaq Elahi Chowdhury, a leading security analyst of Bangladesh said that migrant workers, particularly who went to the Middle East have been exposed to a particular version of Islam, namely *Wahabi Majhab*; was another factor of this kind of Islamization in Bangladesh<sup>13</sup>. He also mentioned that flow of money from Middle East in disguise of different aid or charity played an important role to strengthen different Islamic political parties existing in Bangladesh.

Immediately after 9/11, Bangladesh was presented as a new hub of terrorism in the international media. However, Islamist militancy has

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<sup>10</sup> J. Harrigan, 'The Rise of Religious Based Radicalism and the De-radicalisation Program in Bangladesh', available at: <https://www.tib.eu/en/378825/The-rise-of-religious-based-the/>, accessed on 17, October 2016.

<sup>11</sup> BEI (2014): Report on "The Role of Media in Countering Radicalisation in Bangladesh" by Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, P – 39.

<sup>12</sup> CTIA, (2016), *Counter Terrorist, Trend and Analysis*, available at: <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/pdf>, accessed on 19 December 2016.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Air Cdr (Retd.) Ishfaq Elahi Chowdhury

become a serious law and order issue after the nationwide serial bomb blasts in August 2005. Bangladesh has not been the site of any major terror attacks afterwards and has not been listed high as terror risk country, although religious militancy has remained as a deeply rooted problem.

Concerns were expressed over the issue of Islamist militancy and terrorism given the rise of serious attacks on bloggers, publishers, university teachers, foreigners and members of minority groups since 2013. Because of these incidents the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) indicates the rise in the score from an historic low of 4.1 in 2012 to 5.47 in 2013 to 5.92 in 2014 and vulnerable to high terrorism risk in an early 2015 assessment.<sup>14</sup> In recent years there has been a significant increase of extremist activities in Bangladesh particularly in 2015 that included serial killings of bloggers and murders of foreign nationals and significantly the “Holey Artisan Bakery” attack in 2016 which killed 29 people, including 20 hostages (18 foreigners and 2 locals).<sup>15</sup>

## **Mutation of the Militants**

Professor Ali Riaz, a leading policy thinker, analyzed that Islamist militant groups in Bangladesh have emerged through five generations.<sup>16</sup> In his research<sup>17</sup> he showed that, first generation extremists were those who have joined the Soviet- Afghan war during 1979-1992 periods and have created Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islam (HUJI) in Bangladesh. The second generation appeared in 1996 with the advancement of the organization named ‘Qital Fi-Sabilillah’. This organization transformed into ‘Jamayat-ul-Mujahedin Bangladesh’ (JMB) in 1998. It was deeply connected with HUJI. The third generation of Islamist radicalisation started from 2001, through the group known as Hizbut Tahrir. Professor Riaz mentioned that, it had a direct linkage with an international movement on-going in other countries.

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<sup>14</sup> Riaz A., (2016), *Bangladesh: Extremism and Shrinking Space for Dissent*, available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/Bangladesh-extremism-shrin.html>

<sup>15</sup> Wikipedia (2016). July 2016 Dhaka attack. Available at: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July\\_2016\\_Dhaka\\_attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2016_Dhaka_attack)

<sup>16</sup> Riaz A (2016) *Who are the Bangladeshi 'Islamic Militants'*; available at: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/485>.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid*



The fourth generation commenced in 2007 through the group known as Jamatul Muslemin which later began to function as 'Ansarulah Bangla Team'. They were influenced by Anwar Alwaki and presently claim to represent al Qaeda in Bangladesh with the name of Ansar Al- Islam.

Emergence of ISIS has hatched the fifth generation. This generation feels affiliated with the ideology of ISIS and some of them are migrating to fight abroad like the first generation. In 2015, the JMB was divided into two groups, one was the older JMB and the new one who left the JMB for some ideological reason has come to be known as Neo-JMB. This new group claims that they belong to the Bangladesh chapter of IS. The study found that no foreign citizen (IS members) stay in Bangladesh for propagating violent extremism. All extremists were home grown but they may have connections with international terrorist groups. The religious political parties in Bangladesh have tried to find common ground with this group.

The fifth generation is an educated youth group, identified in 2015, to be pursuing their objective of establishing an Islamic state in Bangladesh.<sup>18</sup> Very recently they led the most unprecedented savagery in Bangladesh during the month of holy Ramadan in 2016. That brutal incidence was realized in a restaurant at Dhaka's diplomatic zone by a group of 5 young attackers who extinguished the lives of 29 people, including 20 hostages (18 foreigners and 2 locals). All of the attackers were also killed during the rescue operation conducted by the Bangladesh Army. It was found that all of the attackers who were radicalised (to be jihadis) were educated and were from well to do families.

## **Major Incidents of Militants Violence**

The number of attacks by the militant has been on the rise in Bangladesh in the last 11 years. No stratum of society is now left untouched, as people from various backgrounds and professions are being included in militant hit lists. From the secular bloggers, liberal college and university teachers, LGBT magazine editor, Hindu priest, temple worker and trader, Buddhist monk, Christian grocer, Muslim Sufi spiritual leader,

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<sup>18</sup> *ibid*

follower of Baul philosophy to foreign professionals and businessmen.

According to a report by the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 393 people were killed during terrorist attacks in Bangladesh since 2005 to July 17 2016. Among these deaths, there were 360 civilians and 33 security forces personnel. In addition, 243 terrorists themselves were killed.<sup>19</sup>

The data spanning 11 years show that the highest number of killings occurred in 2013, when 246 civilians and security forces (including 133 terrorists) were killed, whereas no one was killed in 2009. For the rest of the years, 26 were killed in 2005, 6 in 2006, 1 in 2007, 1 in 2008, 3 in 2010, 1 in 2012, 40 in 2014, 25 in 2015 and 46 in 2016.

## **2016: Year of Nightmare**

2016 was one of the worst years for Bangladesh in a decade because of the number of vicious militant attacks in the country. Frequent terror attacks and targeted killings has forced Bangladesh into a traumatic situation. Continuous news in local and international media and the claims of IS links behind the incidents by the SITE Intelligence Group tagged Bangladesh as an unsafe state.

The year's first militant attack took place on February through the killing of a Hindu priest. Thereafter, secular online activists, university teachers, gay rights activist, even a Hindu tailor was killed in the following months. In May 2016, a Sufi Muslim spiritual leader, a Buddhist monk and a village doctor was also killed. On this month, a university teacher who was a follower of the Baul philosophy was injured in an attack. In the month of June, a Hindu priest, a Christian grocer who occasionally worked for the church and a Hindu college teacher were killed.

Although, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, IS repeatedly claimed responsibilities for almost all of the aforementioned incidents, the law enforcement agencies denied the existence of IS in the country.<sup>20</sup>

While with the series of malicious target killings, the country was

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<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Bangladesh's Fight Against Militancy in 2016*, *The Daily Sun*, 30 *December*, 2016, available at: [www.daily-sun.com/printversion/Bangladesh%E2%80%99s-fight-against-militancy-in-2016](http://www.daily-sun.com/printversion/Bangladesh%E2%80%99s-fight-against-militancy-in-2016)

struggling to find a way out, in the holy month of Ramadan Bangladesh had to face a cruel terrorist attack on July 1 when a group of 5 armed militants took control of Holey Artisan Bakery, an upscale cafe near the diplomatic zone. The attack killed 20 people including, nine Italians, seven Japanese and an Indian citizen after a 12-hour long hostage situation. A special commando team of Bangladesh Army rescued 13 people before conducting *Operation Thunderbolt* to storm into the restaurant by killing the five terrorists. On July 2 evening, SITE intelligence published photos of the five assassins belonging to IS. Denying the claim, the police said that a new faction of the banned Islamist outfit Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) was responsible for the attack targeting the foreigners in Dhaka to attract international attention.<sup>21</sup>

On the day of Eid-ul-Fitr on July 7, another militant group tried to launch an attack in Sholakia Eidgah, Kishoreganj. 2 Police officers, a bystander woman and one suspected militant were killed, while at least 12 other people were injured.<sup>22</sup> Militants, disguised as the Muslim devotees, wanted to kill Maula Fariduddin Masud, who was leading a campaign of Islamic scholars against militancy. Amidst the tight security, terrorists couldn't reach him, but was able to thwart the biggest Eid prayer congregation of the sub-continent.<sup>23</sup>

## **Major Actors of Militancy**

Extremist elements headed by the Islamists, given their proven ability to destabilize the country, will continue to play significant roles in determining the country's future trajectory. It is important to recognize that not all Islamist groups in Bangladesh are extremist or are propagating violence.

There are many local and internationally linked local Islamist terrorist groups were operating in Bangladesh. Among them ISIS and al-Qaeda both claim their presence in Bangladesh, and are believed to be cooperating with local terror groups in order to recruit and carry

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Bangladesh Blast, Gun Battle Kill 4 During Eid Prayers*, Los Angeles Times, available at: <http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-bangladesh-eid-prayer-attack-20160707-snap-story.html>

<sup>23</sup> *Bangladesh's Fight Against Militancy in 2016*, The Daily Sun, 30 December, 2016, [www.daily-sun.com/printversion/Ban-fight-against-militancy-in-2016](http://www.daily-sun.com/printversion/Ban-fight-against-militancy-in-2016)

out domestic attacks. Beside those, other terror groups operating in Bangladesh are ISIS-affiliated JMB, a Bangladeshi terror group founded in 1998, as well as the al-Qaeda affiliated Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), formed in 2007.

## ISIS

In November 2015, ISIS formally announced its presence in Bangladesh with an article titled “The Revival of Jihad in Bengal” in its online English-language magazine named ‘Dabiq’ including an interview with Sheikh Abu al-Hanif, purportedly the head of ISIS operations in Bangladesh<sup>24</sup>. In the interview, Hanif lauded Bangladesh’s JMB terror group for its ability to resist “the effect of both European colonization and Hindu cultural invasion.”

Although ISIS formally introduced its Bangladeshi operation in November of 2015, the group had been working in Bangladesh since 2014. In August of 2014, ISIS released a Bengali-language video showing various individuals pledging their support for the so-called caliphate<sup>25</sup>. The following month, a British citizen was arrested in the capital city of Dhaka, one of multiple British-born individuals reportedly recruiting for ISIS in Bangladesh and in 2015, another nine individuals were arrested in Bangladesh, accused of planning the overthrow of the government in order to establish a caliphate<sup>26</sup>.

## Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh

Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) is a violent Islamist group formed in 1998 with an aim to replace the current state of Bangladesh with an Islamic State based on Sharia law and seeks to “build a society based on the Islamic model laid out in Holy Quran-Hadith.”, It opposes the political system of Bangladesh and opposes democracy as being in violation of Islamic law<sup>27</sup>.

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<sup>24</sup> Dabiq (2015). The Rivival of Jihad in Bengal, Dabiq: Issue 12, Safar 1437. Available at: <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-12e280b3.pdf>

<sup>25</sup> ISIS in Bangladesh?, The Dhaka Tribune online report, August 07 2014, updated on November 21, 2015. Available at: <http://archive.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2014/aug/07/isis-bangladesh>

<sup>26</sup> British Islamic State suspect arrested in Bangladesh The telegraph, 29 Sep 2014

According to reports, JMB members have also coordinated with the Pakistani-based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and members have moved from Bangladesh into Pakistan in order to receive LeT training<sup>28</sup>.

## **Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent**

In September 2014, in a video message, Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced a new branch 'Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)' in the Indian sub-continent with the declaration that, a new branch of al-Qaeda was established in the Indian Subcontinent, seeking to raise the flag of jihad, return the Islamic rule, and empowering the Shariah of Allah across the Indian subcontinent<sup>29</sup>. In Bangladesh, AQIS reportedly operates with local terror group Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) and claimed responsibility for number of killings in Bangladesh.

## **Ansarullah Bangla Team**

Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) is the Al-Qaeda affiliate in Bangladesh, formed in 2007, which was banned in 2015. ABT spreads pro-ISIS and pro-Al-Qaeda material both in person and online. According to reports, the group has previously uploaded Bengali-language versions of ISIS's *Dabiq* magazine and al-Qaeda's *Inspire*. Videos reportedly uploaded by ABT have included explicit references to potential targets, including Bangladesh's parliament building. The group has also reportedly published videos with bomb-making instructions<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> Terrorism Research nad Analysis Consortium (n.d). Jama'at Ul Mujahideen Bangladesh. Available at <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jamaat-ul-mujahideen-bangladesh-jmb>

<sup>28</sup> Counter Extremism Project (n.d). Bangladesh: Extremism and Counter-Extremism. Available at: <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/bangladesh>

<sup>29</sup> Long War Journal (2014). *Al-Qaeda opens branch in the 'Indian Subcontinent'*. Available at: [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/al\\_qaeda\\_opens\\_branc.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/al_qaeda_opens_branc.php)

<sup>30</sup> Counter Extremism Project (n.d). Bangladesh: Extremism and Counter-Extremism. Available at: <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/bangladesh>

## Focus on youth

Youths are consistently and deliberately targeted by terrorist and violent extremist groups for radicalisation and recruitment. The advantages in targeting the youths into joining terrorists groups are many and terrorists are displaying increased capability and capacity in enlisting them. For instance, youths with no prior police records are especially targeted as they allow terrorist and violent extremist groups more operational freedom, since it reduces the likelihood of arrest of the more senior terrorist leaders<sup>31</sup>. Such youths also have the added advantage of allaying suspicion on the part of the security and law enforcement authorities. It is estimated that youths between 15 to 18 years make up about 20 per cent of all suicide bombers and terrorist groups. Groups who have suffered losses in terms of their members often times are forced to recruit youths as much of the adult population are simply too weary for conflict and are reluctant to continue the struggle.<sup>32</sup> Youths are also, at times, given more dangerous tasks on the assumption that if they are caught they would receive lighter sentences due to their age. There is also the possibility that youths and young adults are targeted because of the skills that they might possess to ensure a cadre of educated and technically capable leaders for terrorist attacks. Youths are also important in ensuring continuity.

Ignorance of religious teaching opposed to violence, makes youth more vulnerable and susceptible to recruitment<sup>33</sup>. Religious institutions have the potential to capture the mind of the young people with misconstrued interpretation of religion. ‘Coupled with the actual injustices happening all around the world, these ‘men of God’ clinically exploit the minds and hearts of the youths into thinking that the only alternative left is that of violence. Having the advantage of ‘god’ on their side, these youths are manipulated into believing that they are actually struggling for a noble and worthy cause, with the assurance of victory<sup>34</sup>.

<sup>31</sup> Samuel, T. K. (2012). *The Lure of Youth into Terrorism*, South East Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism (SEARCT). Available at: <http://www.searct.gov.my/featured-articles/55-the-lure-of-youth-into-terrorism>

<sup>32</sup> *ibid*

<sup>33</sup> United States Institute of Peace (2014). Special Report 348, June 2014. Available at: [https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why\\_do\\_Youth\\_Join\\_Boko\\_Haram.pdf](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf)

<sup>34</sup> ‘Why many youths have turned into terrorists’ (May 16, 2017). The Times. Retrieved from: <http://www.times.mw/why-many-youths-have-turned-into-terrorists/>

Besides the religious institutes, education institutes especially universities and institutions of higher learning are also being turned into recruiting pools for terrorists<sup>35</sup>.

Internet proved very useful for the terrorist groups to reach and recruit the young that had been difficult through traditional methods.<sup>36</sup> According to noted academic and expert on terrorism issues Professor Bruce Hoffman from Georgetown University, USA, “virtually every terrorist group in the world today has its own Internet website and, in many instances, multiple sites in different languages with different messages tailored to specific audiences.”<sup>37</sup>

## Objectives

The purpose of this study was to investigate local drivers and dynamics of radicalisation in Bangladesh. The key objectives of the study were as follows:

- Study/analyze the dynamics of youth radicalisation in Bangladesh
- Identify the key drivers of violent extremism in Bangladesh
- Identify the techniques/pathways of ISIL recruitment in Bangladesh
- Recommend key interventions that can prevent radicalisation drivers and extremist recruitment in Bangladesh

This study aimed to enhance knowledge on Bangladeshi youth’s perspective of violent extremism. This research will help to guide the concerned government agencies to revisit its policies about the role of youths in violent extremism. In this context, the potential users of the study would be as follows:

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<sup>35</sup> Samuel, T. K. (2012). *The Lure of Youth into Terrorism*, South East Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism (SEARCT). Available at: <http://www.searct.gov.my/featured-articles/55-the-lure-of-youth-into-terrorism>

<sup>36</sup> *ibid*

<sup>37</sup> Bruce Hoffman, “The Use of the Internet By Islamic Extremists.” Testimony presented to the House Permanent

Select Committee on Intelligence (May 4, 2006) p. 18. Online at: <http://rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT262-1>

- Policy makers;
- Law enforcement groups;
- Administration and government officials;
- Academicians;
- National and international intelligence organizations.

The following sections provide detailed information about the methodology for the study and the main findings. The last section offers recommendations for policy makers, law enforcement agencies, families, educational institutes and media based on the study's findings. Relevant table, questionnaire, KII and FGD guidelines can also be found in the in report's annex.



## Methodology

### Study Design

The aim of the study was to explore key local drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism in Bangladesh. The study combines both quantitative and qualitative approaches.

The quantitative approach was conducted through a survey by using a structured questionnaire of variables, measured with numbers and analyzed with statistical procedures, to explore the youth perception on local drivers for radicalisation. A qualitative approach, which included Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) was used to explore how different groups including law enforcement agencies, education institutions, guardians/family, society etc. play a role in preventing violent extremism. Additionally, secondary data was collected through a view of existing literature. These approaches are described below.

*Quantitative data collection:* A structured questionnaire of approximately 90 minutes in length was used. A short field test preceded the full commencement of fieldwork to ensure that the question wording and subject matter were conducive to capturing reliable data. A review of the data collected for the first 10 respondents indicated that all questions were being answered in a sensible manner, and the KII and FGD guideline were applicable a reasonable level of detail in responses.

*Qualitative survey:* To validate findings from the individual survey, to identify issues not raised in the questioner survey, and to provide additional understanding, the individual survey was supported by a qualitative survey involving focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KII).

*Respondent of Key Informant Interviews (KII):* Key informants were selected from various target audiences and bridging populations involved with extremist violation in Bangladesh related issues.

*Respondent of Focus Group Discussion (FGD):* The participants of FGD were the representative from the primary stakeholder including all segment of mentioned educational institutes both girls & boys.

*Secondary sources (existing literature review):* Existing literature such as research reports, program reports and different publications relevant to extremist violation in Bangladesh and countries like Bangladesh. The pertinent and salient findings of the desk review were documented as part of a comprehensive report. This would supplement with knowledge gained through in-depth study with the intended audiences that is synthesized separately in the report.

## **Study area and population**

Dhaka is the capital of Bangladesh comprising people from diverse background. Most of the renowned public universities and private universities are in Dhaka. It should be noted that the majority of the terrorists involved in recent attacks came from the universities based in Dhaka. Some were former students of these universities too. Considering the resources for the study and the opportunity of access the study area covered both North and South City Corporation of Dhaka (Dhaka Metropolitan Areas). The total numbers of individual respondents were 173 from both public and private educational institutes.

The age group was 15 to 30 years old as determined in Bangladesh's youth policy. The age group of respondents for KII was above 30. One interview was with the mother of a radicalised militant. The KII informant from law enforcement agency was senior level official and directly involved in the de-radicalisation process in Bangladesh.

Respondents were from different districts of Bangladesh as well as Dhaka. To understand why this issue is prevalent within the youth population, the study targeted respondents from the following groups/categories:

- Students from both private and public educational institute;
- Victims of violent extremist attacks
- Law enforcement agency personnel
- Eye witnesses of violent extremist attacks
- Religious clerics of various denominations
- Young women
- Academia - those are involve in education and research profession and have vast experience on topics related to violent extremism
- Practitioners with direct experience in dealing with violent extremist and related activities.

Table – 1: Category wise sample sizes for the study

Types of method	Sample size	Category-wise study population					
		Students	Academia	Practitioner	Law Enforcement Agency	Eye witnesses	Victims
Q. survey	105	105	00	00	00	00	00
KII	10	00	3	2	2	1	2
FGD	6 with 63 participants	63	00	00	00	00	00
Total	178	168	3	2	2	1	2

There were 67% male and 33% female participants. Among them 91% were Muslim, 8% Hindu and 1% Buddhist. Respondents were from public university, private university and government/private colleges. There were 51% respondents from private universities, 32% from public colleges and 17% from government and private colleges. Regarding marital status 93% were single and 7% were married. (See tables for details).

Table - 2: Demographic information of the respondents

Age group	Percent	Type of educational Institute	Percent	Religion	Percent	Gender	Percent	Marital status	Percent
15-20	31%	Gov./ Private college	17%	Hindu	8%	Male	67%	Married	7%
21-25	61%	Public University	32%	Buddha	1%	Female	33%	Single	93%
26-30	8%	Private University	51%	Muslim	91%				

In terms of the residential status of the respondents, 34% live in mess/ shared households, 25% live in their own house with family, 21% live in their education institute's hall/hostel and 18% live in rented house with their family. Among the respondents 31% mentioned that business is the main source of their income and government service is mentioned by 29%. Both the private service and agriculture were mentioned by 15% respondents as the source of family income. Regarding monthly family income there were 23% respondents from families with monthly income of 35,000 taka (about \$430 USD) or more. Monthly family income from 15,000–19,999 taka were for 21% and 17% mentioned 10,000 – 14, 999 taka as their monthly family income. Among the respondents 79% said that main bread earner of their families are male, 20% mentioned both and only 1% said that the main bread earner of their families are female (See table for details)

Table - 3: Residential status and income of the respondents for survey

Residence status	Percent	Income range	Percent	Main source of family income	Percent	Main bread winner of the family	Percent
Own house with family	25%	≤ 10,000	16%	Business	31%	Male	79%
Rented house with family	18%	10,000-14,999	17%	Government service	29%	Female	1%
Single in rented house	2%	15,000-19,999	21%	Private service	15%	Male female both	20%
Educational institutes hall/hostel	21%	20,000-24,999	13%	Agriculture	15%		
Mess/ shared house	34%	25,000-29,999	3%	Foreign remittance	3%		
		30,000-34,999	7%	Dairy/ hatchery	1%		
		≥ 35,000	23%	Others	6%		

## Data Processing and Analysis

The research followed a combination of quantitative and qualitative data analysis techniques. In quantitative analysis, the researcher developed layout of different tables as per needs. After manual scrutiny, all data was entered into statistical software (SPSS) database. Range and consistency were checked in and built into the data entry system. From the output of the database, the researcher analyzed the data and presented them in a descriptive from the different diagrams by using the Microsoft Excel software.

Qualitative data was analyzed using content analysis techniques. Initially all the transcripts were verified for accuracy and consistency. Following this, data was coded thematically according to the research objectives. Finally, a transcript was compiled and summarized.

## **Limitations**

Although this research was carefully prepared there were some unavoidable limitations. First, because of limited resources and time the research was conducted only with a small sample size which is not an adequate representative sample for the youth of Bangladesh. Therefore, to generalize the research findings for all youth of Bangladesh a larger sample and systematic sampling is required. Nevertheless, the research will provide an idea about youth's perception of violent extremism and could help to inform a larger nationwide research on this topic.

Second, given that the research was on a sensitive topic, many of the respondents were hesitant to speak with the research team, particularly on issues about extremist and militancy. Although confidentiality was assured, in some cases, participants left the discussion immediately when the purpose of the research was described. Female respondents were also not comfortable to talk about this issue.

Third, due to limited resources the designed questionnaire was piloted within a very limited sample. A wider pre-testing of the data collection instruments might enhance the tools for more effective data collection.

Fourth, although there were some literature available on militant activities in Bangladesh, there is a lack of research based on primary data specifically on youth population. While reviewing literature, the research team was mainly dependent on general literature on this issue.

# Major Findings

## Findings from Survey Data

### Familiarity with the Concept and Source of Knowledge

Youths are familiar with the concepts militancy, extremism, and terrorism. All the respondents heard those words in some form. Among them, 68% heard mostly militancy, 30% heard terrorism and 2% have heard of extremism. The responses were almost similar for both male and female respondents (see the table 4 for detail).

**Table – 4: Familiarity with the word terrorism, extremism and militancy**

Words	Percent all	Percent Male	Percent Female
Militancy	68%	68.7%	66.7%
Terrorism	30%	1.5%	3%
Extremism	2%	29.9%	30.3%
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

In a multiple choice question youths were asked to select the source where they have heard of those words. Analyzing the multiple response data, it shows that television has the highest responses as the source (48.3%) and newspapers (35.2%). In addition to this, 9% responded that they have heard those words from their friends, 3.4% for the educational institutes and 4.1% for others. Television as a source of knowledge regarding these was mentioned higher by 5.7% female than the male. The newspapers was mentioned less, by about 6% of female than the male (See the Annexed table 5 for detail).

**Table – 5: Source of knowledge**

\*Multiple response analysis

Source	Percent all	Percent Male	Percent Female
Television	48.3%	46.4%	52.1%
Newspaper	35.2%	37.1%	31.2%
Friends	9.0%	9.3%	8.3%
Education Institute	3.4%	3.1%	4.2%
Others	4.1%	4.1%	4.2%

### Actors of radicalisation

As for actors of radicalisation, 39% referred to foreign powers as the main actor for facilitating radicalisation and 33.1% held the political parties to be responsible. In the case of a religious group as the actor of radicalisation, was polled by 22% of the youth. In the case of religious groups as actors of radicalisation females responded lower by 4% than male. Females held political parties to be more responsible than males (see the table 6 for details).

**Table – 6: Actors of radicalisation**

\*Multiple response analysis

Actors	Percent	Percent Male	Percent Female
Foreign power	39.0%	39.0%	39.0%
Political party	33.1%	32.5%	34.1%
Religious group	22.0%	23.4%	19.5%
Others	5.9%	5.2%	7.3%

### Opinion on Radicalisation

Among the respondent, 86% said that radicalisation is bad and 14% said that they do not know whether it is good or bad. Percentage of female respondents is about 3% higher than male among those who opined that radicalisation is bad (See the table 7 for details).




**Table – 7: Opinion on radicalisation**

Opinion	Percent all	Percent Male	Percent Female
Good	0%	0%	0%
Bad	86%	85.1%	87.9%
Don't know	14%	14.9%	12.1%

Among them, 41% were of the opinion that radicalisation created chaos in the society. According to 40% of the respondents radicalisation created negative image of the country internationally, while 15% responded that it is an obstacle to the development of the country.

### Reasons for Radicalisation



Religious extremism in Bangladesh is often connected with global extremism at least as an ideological factor. Critically, as ISIS is losing its foothold in Syria and Iraq, it is looking to expand its operations in other parts of the world. However, it is also important to note key local drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism in Bangladesh. These include a sense of inequalities among the different community members of society. Furthermore, a feeling of marginalization as a greater community of *Islamic Ummah*, is encouraging even socially affluent people to get involved in 'Jihad'.

There is an increase of Islamic militant groups in Bangladesh for over a decade. Although law enforcement authorities have sent many of them for trial, the growth remains unaffected. At the early stages, it was primarily people of religious institutions who formed extremist groups were the ones who were radicalised. Recently it has been found that educated young minds have been radicalised and betrothed to create fear-provoking environment in the country.

Amidst sharp political polarization, Bangladesh is presently witnessing a resurgence of radical Islamism. Islamist militancy and terrorism is a complex and multidimensional problem for Bangladesh since no single explanation can be applied to understanding the roots of Islamist militancy and terrorism there. Riaz (2008) views Islamist militancy as caused by the complex web of domestic, regional and international events and dynamics in Bangladesh. Riaz also argues that Islamist militancy is the result of both errors of omission (the state, politicians and the civil society failed to do things that could have stemmed the rise of militancy) and errors of commission (the state, politicians, and the civil society did things that worsened the situation). The rise of religious militancy and terrorism is linked to various factors, such as domestic, regional and international; historical-political; madrassa, political patronage; and political, economic and cultural factors.<sup>38</sup>

Many foreign scholars and media reports link the issue with the upsurge of Islamist political parties, madrassa education, political patronage, and Taliban/al Qaeda presence (Datta, 2007; Harrison, 2006; Vaughn, 2007; Rahman, 2004; Quamruzzaman, 2010; Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 2009; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2003). Quamruzzaman (2010) identified poverty and resource deprivation, economic dislocation and social disorganization, political blame game and patronization, and easy access to arms and ideological apparatuses as the major factors of militant motivation in Bangladesh.<sup>39</sup>

The trend of militancy in Bangladesh is a direct consequence of global phenomena, as local militants are inspired from global militant activities, according to Monirul Islam, Chief of Counter-Terrorism


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<sup>38</sup> Rahman MA, (2016), *The Forms and Ecologies of Islamist Militancy and Terrorism in Bangladesh*, available at: <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article>.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*.

and Transnational Crimes unit (CTTC). In contrast, Professor Dr. Zia Rahman, Chairman of Dhaka University's Criminology Department suspected that the rise of militancy in Bangladesh since the 1990s is a result of conflict in internal politics and a main reason for the recent surge has been the trial of war criminals.<sup>40</sup>

Among the options (economical, religious, political and others) 39.6% responses came out that political matters are the reason for radicalisation. Religion as a reason polled 30.5% and economic reasons received 18.8% responses.



While asking the respondents about the argument for those conomical, religious, political and other reasons of radicalisation they mentioned several arguments for those. Some frequently mentioned argument illustrated in table 8 below.


<sup>40</sup> RAB (2016), Unpublished Study Report on *Violent Extremism in Bangladesh: A Study on Youth Perception*, P. – 34.

**Table - 8: Argument for the reason behind radicalisation**

Economic	Political	Religious	Cultural	Others
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Poverty</li> <li>- Temptation of money</li> <li>- Temptation of power</li> <li>- Contact with foreign power to earn money</li> <li>- Unemployment</li> <li>- Social inequality</li> <li>- Unrest in family</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Temptation of power</li> <li>- To keep own existence</li> <li>- Exhibit power</li> <li>- Rival attitude/hatred</li> <li>- Political frustration</li> <li>- To create political unrest</li> <li>- To get foreign sympathy</li> <li>- To demolish other opinion</li> <li>- Political revenge</li> <li>- Religious parties influence</li> <li>- Ruin the image of government</li> <li>- Unequal distribution of power</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Misinterpretation and wrong concept</li> <li>- Excessiveness</li> <li>- Blind faith and Forcefully imply own faith</li> <li>- Ideology</li> <li>- Protect religion</li> <li>- Prejudice</li> <li>- Lack of values</li> <li>- Teaching wrong methods</li> <li>- Temptation from foreign</li> <li>- Religious slander</li> <li>- Insufficient religious knowledge and lack of understanding</li> <li>- Politics in the name of religion</li> <li>- Rival among religious beliefs</li> <li>- Temptation of religious development</li> <li>- Temptation of heaven</li> <li>- Violence in the name of jihad</li> <li>- Lied promise by keeping religion in front</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Indecent dress of women</li> <li>- Degenerate culture</li> <li>- Obscene cinema</li> <li>- Showing different meaning of culture</li> <li>- Absence of recreation opportunity</li> <li>- Imaginary movie</li> <li>- Rapid change of culture</li> <li>- To be a hero</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Frustration in personal life</li> <li>- Social change</li> <li>- Oppression of expression</li> <li>- Lack of cultural direction</li> <li>- Lack of awareness</li> <li>- No anti militancy write up in school textbooks</li> <li>- Militant companion</li> <li>- No advocacy about harm of militancy</li> <li>- Arms business</li> <li>- Economic recession</li> <li>- Foreign power</li> <li>- Lack of ideology</li> </ul>

## Type of Educational Institute Where Most Youths were Radicalised

Among the respondents, 50% of them said that youth from private university were involved in radicalisation, *Kawmi* madrasah as an incubator was opined by 14%. However, 13% said that there is no specific institutions where youths engaged with radicalisation as from all kinds of institutions youths were involved with radicalisation.




## Reason for the youth to engage more with radicalisation

The target group for recruitment by militant groups were mainly the young population. They are not only madrasah students, but also from other institutions. There is some frustration in the youth of the upper-class as well as among lower income families. For the youth of poor families, they are using the suppression and showing the dream of justice for them by establishing true Islam. In the upper class families, there is also frustration in their family life as young people are not getting the love and affection they need. Moreover, Sometimes, they experienced their families to be involved in unethical activities. Militant groups used those kinds of frustrated youths and provoked them to join with them to get rid of those frustrations.

While asking for reasons why youths are involved with radicalisation, 62.9% respondent were of the opinion that youths are convinced by others very easily. Radicalised persons are presented as role models for the youths according to 18.5% of the respondents. Moreover, 12.1% responded that youths are involved in radicalisation because they are

more violent. However, 2.4% respondents came in with the case that youths are interested to do such activities.



**Means of radicalisation**

Ideological influence is the most powerful mean to engage youth in radicalisation, as mentioned by the respondents. This was mentioned by 39.8% responses while 33.1% responded that social media is the means to engage them. Another 6.8% opined that contacts were made in coaching centers or educational institutes and 17.3% referred to area based contact as the means of engagement of youth in radicalisation. In the case of social media female response was 9.2% higher than male. Moreover, Ideology as a tool of youth involvement in radicalisation was mentioned by 4.4% less by female responded than male respondents (for details please see table 9).


**Table: - 9: Tools of youth involvement with radicalisation**

\*Multiple response analysis

Way of involvement	Percent all	Percent Male	Percent female
Ideologically	39.8%	41.4%	37.0%
Social media	33.1%	29.9%	39.1%
Area based communication	17.3%	18.4%	15.2%
Coaching center or educational institute	6.8%	6.9%	6.5%
Others	3.0%	3.4%	2.2%

## The approach used to radicalise youth

Among the respondents, 34% response on that misleading idea is being used mostly to use the youth in the radicalisation process. The temptation of well-being in the afterlife, in other words, desire to get heaven in the afterlife is another big issue to use the youth population in the radicalisation process. However, the temptation of power and temptation of money as fueling radicalisation was held by 14% and 11% of the respondents respectively. Using the natural furor of youth and capitalizing on poverty is mentioned by 7% and 6% of the respondents respectively. The addiction to narcotics is also a way to involve the youth in radicalisation (See the annexed table 10 for details).



## Most powerful mediums to motivate youth to radicalisation

The Internet is the most powerful media to motivate the young population to radicalisation was mentioned by 61% of the respondents. Among the respondents 18% opined that group contact and 11% mentioned individual contact as motivators. Although the mobile phone is an element of daily life but it is mentioned by only 2% of the respondents.

There were some differences in responses between male and female respondents. In the case of the internet, female response is 17.5% higher than male, whereas the response to individual contact is 11.9% less and group contact is 4.2% less than male respondents. No female


response for books as a medium that motivate youth to radicalisation was observed (see the table 10 for details).

**Table 10: Most powerful mediums that motivate in radicalisation**

Medium	Percent all	Percent male	Percent female
Internet	61%	55.2%	72.7%
Group contact	18%	19.4%	15.2%
Individual contact	11%	14.9%	3.0%
Books	4%	6.0%	0%
Newspaper	2%	1.5%	3.0%
Mobile phone	2%	1.5%	3.0%
Others	2%	1.5%	3.0%
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

### Use of the internet to involve youth


Mostly, 29% said that different Facebook page is a strong tool to involve youth. Jihadi blogs/websites are mentioned by 26%. Ideological blogs/websites was mentioned by 24%. Various links are sent in support of radicalisation via Facebook was mentioned by 14%.






## Observation regarding the internet

Most of the respondents (73%) mentioned that they have no direct experience regarding radical activities through the internet. The indirect invitation has been received by 9% respondents. Another 9% mentioned that they received ideological/jihadi links through the internet related to radicalisation. Among the respondents, 4% of them mentioned that they received a direct invitation, while 3% said that they read blogs which motivate to radicalisation.



## Sender of invitation or link


Among the respondents, 71% never got any invitation or link through social media. Rest of them i.e. 16% received the invitation from strangers. Senior fellows and friends sent a link to 6% of the respondents, friends sent to 5% and others sent to 2% of the respondents.



Way-out from Radicalisation


Option with multiple answers, the question of the way out from radicalisation was asked to the

respondents. Analyzing the responses, data shows that 27% argued for social and political unity while 25% were in favor of raising awareness about radicalisation. Reducing unemployment was mentioned as a way out by 19% and 10% said awareness rising through education institute could be another way out of radicalisation.



Ways to prevent youth from radicalisation

About half of the respondents which is 51% said that awareness raising could prevent the youth from engaging to violent extremism/militancy. Moral education can prevent the same said 35% of the respondents.



Ranking of different institutions

While it was asked of the respondents to make ranking among the selected five institutions


which could play the most effective role in finding a way out of radicalisation, religious institutions were ranked 1 based on the responses. Second position was to the educational institutes. 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> were respectively given to the law enforcement agencies, Family and mass media.

Table – 11: Ranking of Institutions to way out from radicalisation

Rank	Institutions
1	Religious institutions
2	Educational institutions
3	Law enforcement agencies
4	Family
5	Mass media

Most Influential Part of Law Enforcement Agencies against Radicalisation

Among the mentioned law enforcement agencies (Police, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), and others) in the questionnaire, 48% responded with police that could play a strong role to de- radicalisation or prevent radicalisation. In the case of RAB response were 25% and 21% in the case of the military. Among the respondents 6% mentioned others which included Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB).



## **Role of Police**

Police work in field level so they can do a lot. If the police fulfill their responsibilities and help people they could demolish militant activities.

**Capacity building:** The Police needed updated training and be neutral and professional in discharging its duties. A counter-radicalisation special cell of the police could make them more effective. Police force should enhance ICT skills. There should not be any unjustified punishment to anyone.

**Surveillance:** Surveillance on rented house tenants, Surveillance on the suspects, Surveillance to CCTV, FB page, News portal, Blog, etc should be undertaken.

**Awareness raising campaign:** The Police could arrange awareness raising campaign for people.

## **Role of RAB**

RAB works honestly. They are more aware and responsible than any other law enforcement agency. RAB can play a more active role in de-radicalisation or in case of creating counter narratives to the radical narrative.

**Regular operation:** Regular operation and more hardline operations were needed against violent extremism and militant activities.

**Advocacy campaign:** Advocacy campaign against violent extremism or militant activities could be done by RAB

## **Role of BGB**

BGB is mainly deployed in the border areas to secure the border. They have to ensure that illegal arms are not proliferating through the border.

## **Role of the Military**

As people feel more reliant to the military as they work neutrally so they can participate to eradicate militancy. They can organize different campaign to create awareness among people, enhance intelligence activities and work at the field level dealing with militancy.

## **Conclusion and Recommendations**

As terrorist violence from Islamist militant's spreads across the world, affected states are struggling to devise effective responses. So far, most of their responses including those in Bangladesh have addressed the visible symptoms of the terrorist threat through military, police and intelligence measures. These are, of course, essential to stem the terrorist tide. Unfortunately, these responses are often insufficient or are not sustained for a duration which is necessary make an impact.

To develop the right responses, it is essential to honestly analyze and address the prime causes of Islamist radicalisation. As extremist violence in the name of Islam in Bangladesh is linked to various forms and ecologies of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism. It should be borne in mind that only law-enforcement measures cannot prevent Islamist militancy and extremism in Bangladesh. An integrated and comprehensive counter terrorism strategy balancing enforcement, intervention and prevention, taking into consideration of various socioeconomic, political and cultural factors, is urgently needed.

Findings from this study show that youths are aware about Islamist radicalisation and its effect on the society. They have drawn clear distinction between religious extremism and other kinds of violence. Moreover, the respondents were of the dominant view that religious extremism is not personal, while other kinds of violence is an outburst of personal intention created by self- interest.

Youth perception is that, political causes are the main reasons for radicalisation in Bangladesh and very next to political reason they mentioned that religious factors also play a role in Islamist radicalisation. Mainly the youths are engaging in radicalisation to violent extremism and this is primarily because they are easy to convince with an ideology or doctrine. Social media plays a significant role to spread and support radicalisation. Radicals are doing their propaganda through online

platforms and supporters are spreading the message to other people.

Universities and institutions of higher learning were also being turned into recruiting pools for radicalisation. This problem is further compounded by local students going abroad to study but were instead being indoctrinated and radicalised. Not only were they ‘infected’ with jihadist ideas but they ‘import’ these ideas to their local settings when they return home. Besides, the internet has been a useful tool particularly in reaching out to the young and has been a vital tool for violent extremists in overcoming their handicap to acquire and attract young new recruits.

Although most of the youths expressed radicalisation and violent extremism as a bad influence but one tenth of them said that they don’t know about whether it is good or bad. This floating portion of youth may be at risk of becoming radicalised and engaging in militancy which needs to be addressed to prevent them from such activities. Based on the study findings, both the survey and key informant interview, we recommend the following points for the concerned and respective institutions to protect the youth from involvement in radicalisation:

## **1. Law enforcement agencies**

**Monitoring and surveillance:** Law enforcement agencies need to do monitoring and surveillance in their assigned areas. Especially they need keep surveillance on the youth and their activities.

**Punishment:** Law enforcement agencies should ensure the punishment of terrorists who are apprehended. They need to make a quick arrest of the accused and send those to court with strong evidence. Severe punishment of terrorists will discourage others from engaging in such activities.

**Advocacy:** The law enforcement agencies can take initiatives for a remedy and correction of the deviants.

## **2. Education institutions**

**Monitoring:** Teachers can monitor the activities and behavior of students. If there any suspicious changes observed, they can inform the student’s parents or guardians.

**Awareness raising:** Educational institutions can take programs for awareness raising about the harmful impact of radicalisation. This could be in both in formal and informal ways. Teaching the curriculum, identifying moral or value education and emphasizing on those lessons could be one way to make the base for identifying right and wrong ways of life. Besides the class, teaching institutes could arrange programs where a scope could be created to discuss radical activities.

**Vocational education:** Educational institutions could emphasis on vocational education so that the learners do not frustrate about their job and employment prospects.

**Building a progressive society through education:** Knowledge based progressive society can eliminate radical activities. Educational institutes can play the main role in building a knowledge- based and progressive society through education.

**Inclusive education:** Inclusive education would build the mind of a child to respect all religions and segments of society.

### 3. Family

**Monitoring the children of the family:** Family members need to monitor the activities and behavior of their children. If anything is found to be suspicious, they need to talk and find out what is going on and should undertake necessary remedial actions.

**Awareness raising:** Family could play a role to aware the youth about militant activities.

**Education through family:** The family is the main educator. The family could provide value education, ethics, moral, humanitarian and religious education and also could teach what is right and what is wrong

**Family bonding:** Quality time with children is essential for family bonding. Attention to their problems, accountability, effective communication among family members, especially with the children would increase the family bonding.

**Leadership in the family:** leadership in the family could help to build ideology; help the children to understand the fact or situation rather ishing them.

#### 4. Religious institutions

**Religious education and explanation of religion:** Religious institutes can play a role by providing correct religious education and not to provoke anyone to radicalisation. They can enhance religious knowledge and make sure that not spreading wrong explanation and radical ideology.

**Discourage fundamentalism:** During discussions on religion in mosques especially in *khutba at Jummah Prayer* (Friday congregation), fundamentalism should not be encouraged.

**Analysis and research on Quran and Hadith:** There is a need to explore the correct and responsible knowledge in the religious education institutions and correct analysis of the Quran and Hadith.

**Explanation about violent extremism and militancy:** The religious institutions need to explain that religion does not approve radical activities. There should be sustained discussions for not supporting radical activities, even if it is in the name of religion. They could discuss the bad effects on the society and punishment in the religion for harmful radical activities.

#### 5. Mass media

**Accurate information:** Mass media need to broadcast correct information and authentic news.

**Awareness raising:** Media itself should be aware first about radicalisation and thereby not fall into the trap of spreading radical views through their own ignorance. Mass media should produce programs and writings for awareness and constructive activities. They can aware people by exposing the destructive aspects of radicalisation.

**Avoiding panic news:** The Media should not to broadcast news that make people panic

**Coverage:** Sometimes radical and militant activity gets more coverage in the news or other programs. It media should be careful in contributing to spreading the support base against militancy.



**Neutrality:** They can help by acting impartially and by revealing the true nature of radical Islam.

### **Policy Makers:**

#### **Develop National Strategy and Agency for Counter-Extremism**

There should be a dedicated National Counter Terrorism Agency - a national body to be

developed under which various counter-terrorism bureaus and agencies could operate in a coordinated way. Having such a national agency would strengthen coordination between the various law enforcement and intelligence agencies involved in fighting terrorism.

**Balanced Socialization for Young People:** At the moment parents are giving the duty of children's developments to other institutions shedding their own responsibilities. Young people are spending time on electronic devices rather than socializing and this is developing them as self-centered beings. Retaining social nursing, healthy way of socialization, social organizations with value-based spirit can play a vital role in the upbringing of young people.

### **Public Awareness Campaigns**

Government may introduce and emphasize on information campaigns for de-radicalisation or counter-radicalisation which should be highly accessible and target grassroots levels. To this end, community radio stations, TV channels, print media and local theaters are often a more effective means of reaching densely populated rural areas. In Saudi Arabia, a public information campaign was put in place that aimed to counter radicalisation by highlighting the effects of violence on victims.<sup>41</sup> In Pakistan, CSOs have organized a variety of public rallies, conferences and seminars to prompt awareness of the threat of extremism.

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<sup>41</sup> International Peace Institute, (2014), *Beyond Terrorism: De-radicalisation and Disengagement from Violent Extremism*, available: <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/beter.pdf>, accessed on 17 December 2016.

## **International cooperation**

International cooperation has to be sought from countries that are facing similar situation. Development of pool of information, its updating and collaboration of effort is important as it is a global issue.

## **Development of educational and rehabilitative programs**

To accommodate young people in the society who have become victim of extremist organizations will need innovative, empathetic and realistic educational and rehabilitative programs.

## **Shifting from Exclusion to Inclusion**

Present social norms are making young people exclusive and allowing very little room for different thought, belief and approach. A shift from this exclusion approach to inclusion is crucial to prevent young people on engaging with extremists. From an ethics course in school to an opening up of family formalities, every sphere of life needs to accommodate this shift.

Finally, the overall, collective and comprehensive effort of the people of this society to prevent and protect against militancy is essential. If it takes a village to educate a child, then it takes an entire nation to prevent radicalisation.

## Appendix

### Appendix 1: Data tables

**Table 12: Familiarity with the word terrorism, extremism and militancy**

Words	Percent all	Percent Male	Percent Female
Militancy	68%	68.7%	66.7%
Terrorism	30%	1.5%	3%
Extremism	2%	29.9%	30.3%
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Table 13: Source of knowledge**

\*Multiple response analysis

Source	Percent all	Percent Male	Percent Female
Television	48.3%	46.4%	52.1%
Newspaper	35.2%	37.1%	31.2%
Friends	9.0%	9.3%	8.3%
Education Institute	3.4%	3.1%	4.2%
Others	4.1%	4.1%	4.2%

**Table 14: Actors of radicalisation**

\* Multiple response analysis

Actors	Percent	Percent Male	Percent Female
Foreign power	39.0%	39.0%	39.0%
Political party	33.1%	32.5%	34.1%
Religious group	22.0%	23.4%	19.5%
Others	5.9%	5.2%	7.3%

**Table 15: Opinion on radicalisation**

Opinion	Percent all	Percent Male	Percent Female
Good	0%	0%	0%
Bad	86%	85.1%	87.9%
Don't know	14%	14.9%	12.1%

**Table 16: Reason for labeling radicalisation as a bad incident**

Reason	Percent
Chaos in society	41%
Obstacle development	16%
Image crisis in international arena	42%
Others	1%
Total	100

**Table 17: Reason for Radicalisation**

\*Multiple response analysis

Reason	Percent
Economical	18.8%
Political	39.6%
Religious	30.5%
Cultural	3.9%
Others	7.1%

**Table 18: Type of educational institute from where youth involve mostly in radicalisation**

Type of educational institute	Percent
Private university	50%
Kawmi madrasah	14%
Others	13%
Alia Madrasah	9%
Public university	6%
Govt college/University college	4%
Private college	4%
Total	100.0

**Table 19 : Reason for the radicalisation of youth**

\*Multiple response analysis

Reason	Percent
Youths are convinced by others easily	62.9%
Role model	18.5%
Youths are more violent	12.1%
Youths are interested to do such activities	4.0%
Others	2.4%

**Table 20 : Tools of youth involvement with radicalisation**

\*Multiple response analysis

Way of involvement	Percent all	Percent Male	Percent female
Ideologically	39.8%	41.4%	37.0%
Social media	33.1%	29.9%	39.1%
Area based communication	17.3%	18.4%	15.2%
Coaching center or educational institute	6.8%	6.9%	6.5%
Others	3.0%	3.4%	2.2%

**Table 21: Way of using youth in radicalisation**

Way of using youth	Percent
Misleading ideas	34%
Temptation of wellbeing in afterlife	19%
Temptation of power	14%
Temptation of money	11%
Using the furor of youth	7%
Capitalizing of poverty	7%
Drug addiction	6%
Others	2%
Total	100.0

**Table 22: Most powerful mediums motivate in radicalisation**

Medium	Percent all	Percent male	Percent female
Internet	61%	55.2%	72.7%
Group contact	18%	19.4%	15.2%
Individual contact	11%	14.9%	3.0%
Books	4%	6.0%	0%
Newspaper	2%	1.5%	3.0%
Mobile phone	2%	1.5%	3.0%
Others	2%	1.5%	3.0%
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Table 23: Use of the internet to involve youth**

Way of using internet	Percent
Facebook page	29%
Jihadi blog/website	26%
Ideological blog/website	24%
Facebook link	14%
Others	5%
Tweet	2%
Total	100.0

**Table 24: Own observation on internet regarding radicalisation**

Observations	Percent
No experience	73%
Indirect invitation	9%
Ideological/Jihadi link	9%
Direct invitation	4%
Read blogs	3%
Others	2%
Total	100.0

**Table 25: Sender of invitation or link**

Sender	Percent
Never got invited/link	71%
Strangers	16%
Senior fellows	6%
Friends	5%
Others	2%
Total	100.0

**Table 26: Way-out of radicalisation**

\*Multiple response analysis

Way-out of radicalisation	Percent
Social, political unity	27%
Awareness about extremism	25%
Reduce unemployment	19%
Awareness in educational institutes	10%
Neutral view to all communities	8%
Effectively apply of law	4%
Political stability	4%
Objective role of media	2%
Others	1%
Total	100.0

**Table 27: Way of prevention or De-radicalisation**

Way of prevention	Percent
Awareness raising	51%
Moral education	35%
Responsibility to educational institute	6%
Importance to their opinion	3%
Hard punishment	1%
Scope for recreation	1%
Others	3%
Total	100.0

**Table 28: Most influential part of law enforcement agencies against radicalisation**

Agency	Percent
Police	48%
RAB	25%
Military	21%
Others	5%
BGB	1%
Total	100.0



## Appendix 2: Survey Questionnaire

### **‘An Analytical Study on the Local Drivers and Dynamics of Radicalisation in Bangladesh’**

#### **Survey Questionnaire**

**(Information provided in this survey will be used only for research  
purpose. Please  
provide your opinion anonymously. All information will maintained  
with strict confidentiality)**

Date of data collection

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#### **A. Personal Information**

**A1.** Age of the respondent: ☐ **A 2.** Gender 1=☐ Male, 2= Female

**A 3.** Marital Status: ☐ = Married, 2 = Single, 3= Divorced/Separated,  
4=Widow/Widower

**A 4.** Religion: ☐ 1= Hindu 2=Buddhist 3=Christian 4=Muslim 5=Others

**A 5.** Educational qualification: ☐ = 11-12grade/equivalent 2=Undergrad 1<sup>st</sup>  
year/equivalent 3 Undergrad 2<sup>nd</sup> year/equivalent 5= Undergrad 3<sup>rd</sup> year/  
equivalent 6 Undergrad  
4<sup>th</sup> year/equivalent 7 = Masters and above/equivalent

**A 6.**Type of Educational Institute: ☐ = Govt. college 2= Non govt college  
3= Public university 4= Private University  
5= others (Please specify).....

**A 7.** Living place: ☐ 1= Own house with famil 2= Rented house with family  
3= Rented house alone, 4=Educational institutes hall/hostel  
5=Mess

**A 8.** Total monthly family income (aprx.): ☐ = 4999 or less 2= 5000-5999 3  
= 6000-6999 4 = 7000-7999 5 = 8000-8999 6 = 9000-9999  
7= 10000-12499 8= 12500-14999 9=15000-17499 10=17500-19999  
11=20000-24999 12=25000-29999 13= 30000-34999 14=35000 or more

**B. Drivers of violent Radicalisation**

**B 1.** Did you ever hear the words terrorism/extremism/militancy? 1=yes, 2= No

**B 2.** Among those words, which one you have heard most ☐

1 = Militancy 2= Extremism 3=Terrorism 4=Never heard anyone

**B 3 .**From where you have heard? 1= Television 2= Newspaper

3= Friends 4= Education institute

(Please put tick (✓) if there is more than one answer) 5= others (Please specify).....

**B 4.** According to your opinion who is conducting this? ☐

1= Political parties 2=Religious groups

(Put tick (✓) if there is more than one answer) 3 = Foreign power 4= others  
(Please specify).....

**B 5.** What is your opinion about radicalisation? ☐

1= Good 2= Bad 3= don't know

(If the answer is 'good', go to B 6, if 'No' go to B 7, if 'Don't know' go to B 8)

**B 6.** Reason for good ☐ 1= to keep order in society

2= Religious region 3= youths might not stray

4= others (Please specify).....

**B 7.** Reason for bad ☐ 1= Make chaos in society 2= Obstacles

development 3=Made bad reputation in International arena 4= others

(Please specify).....

**B 8.** What are the reasons for radicalisation? Put tick on options below (There could be more than one answer)

1= Economical 2= Political 3= Religious 4= Others

Please specify below, why you are thinking that as a reason for radicalisation:

<b>B 9. Economical</b>	<b>B 10. Political</b>	<b>B 11. Religious</b>	<b>B 12. Others</b>

### C. Engaging into Radicalisation

**C 16.** Why youths are involving more in numbers in radicalisation process? ☐  
(Please put tick if there is more than one answer)

1	Youths are more violent in behavior
2	Youths are easily influenced by others
3	Youths are more interested to do this kind of activities

4	Militancy is presented as role model to the youths
5	Others (Please specify)

**C 17.** From which type of education institute youths are more engaging in radicalisation?

1	Kawmi Madrasah
2	Aliah Madrasah
3	Govt. college/ university college

4	Private college
5	Public university
6	Private university

7	A level/English medium
8	Others (Please specify)

**C 18.** How does youth population captured by radicalisation process? (If answer is more than one please put tick on options)

1	Influencing by ideology
2	Communicate in educational institutes
3	Communicate with social media
4	Communicate in coaching centers

5	Community based communication
6	Study circle
7	Others (Please specify)

**C 19.** How does youths are used by radical groups?

1	Using the furor of the youth
2	Temptation of money
3	Misleading ideas
4	Drug addiction

5	Temptation of power
6	Capitalizing the poverty
7	Temptation of wellbeing in afterlife
8	Others (Please specify)

**C 20.** Which is the most influential mean to influence youths to engage in radicalisation?

1=Newspaper 2=Printed books 3=Internet/cyber world 4=individual contact 5=group contact 6= telephone 7= others (Please specify).....

**C 21.**How does internet used for engaging young people in radicalisation?

1= Sent link through Facebook 2= Open different pages in Facebook  
3= tweet 4= Ideological blogs/websites 5= Jihadi blogs/websites  
6= others (Please specify).....

**C 22.** What is your own observation/experience regarding radicalisation and cyber world?

1= No experience 2= Received invitation directly 3= Received invitation indirectly through different pages 4= Received different jihadi/ideological links 5=follow in twitter 6= Read blogs 7= others (Please specify).....

**C 23.** Do you have any known person's experience/observation on radicalization ?

1=Yes 2=No

(If anyone known to you involved with these activities, please provide information without mentioning identity)

(if the answer is 'Yes', fill up C24 and C 25. If the answer is 'No' please go to the section D)

C 24. if the answer is Yes, describe details in the table below:

Age	Education	Financial status (Poor, middle income, rich)	Present status (if that person is in hide-away, arrest/jail, free, normal life etc.)

C 25. Why and how did s/he engaged with this process?

D. Way to prevent youths from radicalisation

D 1. What are the ways to overcome radicalisation?

1	Social and political unity	7	Development in science and technology
2	Unbiased media	8	Awareness among all people about radicalisation and extremism
3	Objective attitude to all community	9	Awareness through NGOs

4	Effective implementation of laws	10	Awareness campaign in the education institutions
5	Political stability	11	Others (Please specify)
6	Reduce unemployment		

D 2. How to prevent youths from engaging in radicalisation

1	Increase awareness	7	Moral education from childhood
2	Ensure hard punishment	6	Scope of enough recreation
3	Importance to the opinion of youths	7	others (Please specify)
4	Education institutes should take responsibilities		

D 3. Which part of law enforcement agencies could took more vital role to overcome this situation?  
1= Police 2= RAB 3= BGB 4= Military 5= others (please specify).....

D 4. What could be the role of your mentioned agency?D 5. What should be the Role of below mentioned institutions to prevent youth population from radicalisation?

**D 5.** What should be the Role of below mentioned institutions to prevent youth population from radicalisation?

Please rank the below mentioned institutions with serial number and write their role		
Institutions	Ranking according to importance	Role
Law enforcement agencies		
Educational institutions		
Family		
Religious institutions		
Mass media		

**D 6.** Do you have any real life experience about the reason of radicalisation?  
1 = Yes 2 = No  
If yes, how? 1 = Received invitation by own 2 = Received invitation by any family member  
3 = Affected own self 4 = Affected any family member 5 = Not willing to answer  
Case study if the answer is ‘yes’

## **Appendix 3: FGD Guideline**

### **‘An Analytical Study on the Local Drivers and Dynamics of Radicalisation in Bangladesh’**

#### **FGD Guideline**

1. Introduce the discussion with various examples of violent incidents in Bangladesh
2. Concept about violent radicalisation
3. What are the reasons for radicalisation and these are happening. What are the issues that influencing this?
4. How it is progressing and what are the driven forces?
5. What are the recruitment processes and what are the specific narratives for that?
6. From which type of educational institutes students are engaging in radicalisation mostly?
7. What are the factors that encouraging youths to engage with these kinds of activities?
8. How the cyber world/Internet is being used as a mean for spreading radicalisation?
9. What are the ways in internet to spread-out the radicalisation?
10. What are the ways in internet to invite or engage youths in radicalisation?
11. What could be the counteraction in the internet to overcome the propaganda radicalisation?
12. What are the effects in society and in the country?
13. Is there any international effect to the country for these? If yes, what are those?
14. What are the ways to prevail over radicalisation?
  - (Short term)
  - (Mid-term)
  - (Long term);
15. Who could be the catalyst in this overcoming process?
16. What could be the steps to evaluate existing activities of law enforcement agencies and to overcome this situation?
17. What role could be played by community, educational institutes and religious institutes?



**Appendix 4: KII Checklist**

**‘An Analytical Study on the Local Drivers and Dynamics of  
Radicalisation in  
Bangladesh’**

**KII Checklist**

1. Introduce with the issue and explore about his engagement with radicalised activities and mainly his areas of supervision.
2. Why does the radicalisation activities occurring in Bangladesh and are there any political and socio-economic factors related to these?
3. What are the dynamics of radicalisation in Bangladesh?
4. What are the reasons and driving forces of the uprising radicalisation in Bangladesh?
5. Discussion to explore who are being targeted in these radicalisation and why these groups are being targeted
6. What is the mode of present radicalisation and extremist or militant activities in Bangladesh? Is it a part of international militant activities or activities of internal groups?
7. In many cases educated youth in urban areas are involve with militant activities. Why this is happening especially what are the driving factors of involvement of this group?
8. Discussions about the depth of radicalisation and continue violent, extreme and militant activities. Opinion of the interview on how it could be shaped in future and is there any internal power related to this?
9. Discussions about the recent incidents around the globe, how is the international contour at present and is there any relation with those happening in the country? If there is any relation, what it is?
10. Discussions about the role of cyber world/internet and the counteraction regarding radicalisation.
11. What could be the way out of this continuous violence? How the law enforcement agencies, community, political parties, civil society, media, religious institute could play the role. And what could be the coordination process?

12. What should be the techniques and strategies to overwhelm the situation? Is it possible with our internal power and resources? How it could be done?
13. What is your opinion about present law and its application for repression of radicalisation and extremist/militant activities? Do you think it is possible to repress radicalisation and extremist/militant activities through existing laws? If yes how it could be done? If any new unit required to establish, how that could be done?

**Appendix 5 : List of Key Informants**

1. Professor Ali Riaz, Chairman, Department of Politics & Government, Illinois State University, Illinois, USA
2. Professor Serajul Islam Choudhury, Professor Emeritus, Dhaka University
3. Major General Abdur Rashid, Security Analyst and Executive Director, Institute of Conflict, Law & Development Studies (ICLDS),
4. Professor A I Mahbub Uddin Ahmed, Professor Emeritus, Dhaka University
5. Brigadier General Shahedul Anam Khan ndc, psc (Retd), Editor, Op-Ed and Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star
6. Air Commodore Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury, Treasurer of Asia Pacific University, Bangladesh
7. Mr. Selim Mohammad Jahangir, Additional DIG and Director, R&D Cell, RAB Forces Headquarters, Dhaka
8. Mr. Monirul Islam BPM (Bar), PPM (Bar), Additional Commissioner, Counter Terrorism & Transnational Crime, Dhaka Metropolitan Police
9. Mr. Taifur Rahman, Student, Mohammadpur Residential Model College.

**Appendix 6 : Location and Participants of FGDs**

SL No	FGD Location	Total Participants	Boys	Girls
1	North South University, Dhaka North City Corporation	10	6	4
2	BRAC University, Dhaka North City Corporation	10	5	5
3	Titumir College, Dhaka North City Corporation	10	8	2
4	Dhaka University, Dhaka South City Corporation	12	7	5
5	Kobi Nazrul College, South City Corporation	11	6	5
6	Dhaka College, Dhaka South City Corporation	10	10	0
Total	Six institutes in six different location in Dhaka Metropolitan area	63	42	21

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